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POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND ESTATE
TAXES: I*
By LOUIS EISENSTEIN t
THE author of a recent incisive commentary on powers of appointment
and other paraphernalia of property law poses a very pertinent
question: "For what good reason should contemporary American tax-
payers be allowed to skip a generation or two of estate and inheritance
taxes by the use of a verbal form invented several centuries ago to enable
an English gentleman to make a will of land?" I This query is particu-
larly relevant at a time when the Supreme Court is openly contemptuous
of "shadowy and intricate distinctions of common law property concepts
and ancient fictions," 2 and "elusive and subtle casuistries" which feed
upon the "unwitty diversities of the law of property." I If a revenue
system is to function successfully, it must burst the bonds of traditional
property law classifications and concepts, for principles shaped in a dif-
ferent environment of conflict are inadequate instruments for the solution
of modern fiscal problems.4 Not only may property concepts be enmeshed
in elaborate confusion,' but there is always the danger that they will be
imported into the realm of tax law by the convenient principle that "an
interpretation which is in accord with general concepts of property law
is preferable to one which is not." 0 It is therefore necessary to cut through
the entanglements of traditional property rationalism.7
* The opinions expressed herein represent the personal views of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Treasury Department.
' Senior Attorney, Tax Legislative Counsel's Office, Treasury Department.
1. McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition versus Clarification and Refortm
(1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1077, 1114.
2. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 369 (1939).
3. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940). Cf. Helvering v. Reynolds,
313 U. S. 428 (1941).
4. See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT TAXATION (1942) 1059. Cf. Common-
wealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S. W. (2d) 3 (1940), applying
tax principles in the solution of a property question. The American Law Institute has
done likewise. See discussion infra at 304, 324. But cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.
v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 AtI. 531 (1928)..
5. Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 117 (1940),
6. Commissioner v. Solomon, 124 F. (2d) 86, 89 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). See Emmons
v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 412, 50 N. E. 1033, 1034 (1898) ; Attorney-General v. Parker,
31 N. S. R. 202, 206 (1898) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 333, comment a. But
see McDougal, supra note 1, at 1114-15, asking why courts should be encouraged to inter-
pret statutes in terms of "common law dogma" rather than "legislative policy," however
obscure the statement of policy. Cf. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 403 (1941);
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334, 337 (1940).
7. Compare Oliver, Property Rationalism and Tax Pragmatism (1942) 20 TEX, L.
REV. 675.
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Powers of appointment and federal estate taxation constitute an out-
standing case in support of this thesis.' "The power of appointmefit,"
writes Professor Leach, "is the most efficient dispositive device that the
ingenuity of Anglo-American lawyers has ever worked out." I And he
indicates very clearly that powers are extremely "efficient dispositive"
devices to avoid death taxes, if the appropriate ingenuity is employed.Y
Another writer learned in the law of property puts the issue in even sim-
pler, sharper terms: "there has been a tendency in late years to exalt
Powers of Appointment, not for any great use for powers of appoint-
ment in our scheme of things but primarily to evade taxation." "I For
many years the Treasury has struggled along in its effort to prevent avoid-
ance with an obviously inadequate statute, which has been mutilated and
distorted by supposedly "technically elegant" dogma. A renewed legis-
lative attempt has finally been made in the 1942 Revenue Act 13 to cope
with the intricacies of powers and their tax avoidance potentialities.
While the Act marks a point of departure in federal death taxation of
S. See the very able discussions of powers and federal estate taxation in 1 PAUL.
op. cit. supra note 4, c. 9; Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Fedcral Estate Tax
(1939) 52 HA.v. L. Rnv. 929. State death tax aspects are considered in Thompson, State
Death Taxes and Powers of Appointncnt (1941) 26 IowA L RE-v. 549 and Iniheritance
Taxation and Powers of Appointment [1939] Wis. L. RE%. 254; Comment (1939)
28 Ky. L. J. s0.
9. Leach, Powers of Appointment (193S) 24 A. B. A. J. 807.
10. Id. at 808, 809. This is not to say that Professor Leach counsels the use of
powers exclusively for tax avoidance purposes, but he leaves no doubt that one of the
major benefits of powers is happy tax avoidance. He points out that as lng as the prop-
erty can be kept subject to a special power, it will avoid further taxation. He also
observes that under careful drafting a period of upwards of 100 years can be secured for
tax immunity. In addition, he advises the use of precautionary devices to safeguard the
appointive property from a future change in estate ta-xation. Compare Professor Leach's
observations in Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A Dissent (1939)
52 HARv. L. RE%% 961. See also Powell, Powers of Appointment (1941) 10 BnGoQN.yx
L. REv. 233, 234, 249, 256; Covington, Powers of Appointment in Illinois (1933) 33
IL. L. Ray. 262, 268, 279; Thompson, supra note 8, 26 IOWA L. REv, at 549. In this
connection it is interesting to recall that powers of appointment ,,ere originally avoid-
ance devices. They were widely used to escape the rigidity of common law rules as to
the alienation of property, thus enabling one to do that which the law purported to pro-
hibit. Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property (1923) 22 IL. L RL%. 480.
11. Bordwell, Book Review (1939) 53 HAnw. L. Rav. 157, 159-60. Professor Bord-
well adds: "At best this will afford only temporary relief, for death and taxes are sure
to catch up with one." According to 3 RESTATEiENT, PnoPE Rv (1940) 1810-11, as of
1940 "the American case authority on powers of appointment is distinctly thin in quan-
tity," but "the number of cases presented to the courts is now rapidly increasing, due
largely to the very substantial estate and inheritance tax advantages which often can
be obtained by the creation of trusts with powers of appointment"
12. Compare Griffiths v. Commissioner, 30S LT. S. 355, 357 (1939).
13. H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) §§ 403, 452 (hereinafter cited by section
number only).
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appointive property, the case history of the old law is still significant, not
only because a proper reflection of "legislative intention" nmust build
upon the evils of the past, but also because the new treatment does not
affect the estates of decedents who died before the date of enactment of
the 1942 Act. 4 Thus since tax liability of a number of such estates is
yet to be determined pursuant to the discarded statute and its judicial
gloss, the old law is still litigation lav and, in a very practical sense, may
be regarded as "existing" law, although at last stricken from the Code."5
THE PRE-1942 LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The drafters of the original estate tax statute of 1916 were not so
naive as to omit provisions taxing property conveyed by transfer in con-
templation of death or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death, and property held jointly or by the entirety.10 But no
mention was made of a number of significant property relationships, in-
cluding powers of appointment. 7 The first regulations 18 were similarly
silent on the subject of powers. Shortly' thereafter, the Treasury issued
a regulation stating that the gross estate included "property passing under
a general power of appointment." 10 This interpretation was premised
upon section 202(a) of the 1916 Act, which provided for the inclusion
of property in the gross estate "to the extent of the interest therein of
the decedent at the time of his death which after his death is subject to
the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its ad-
ministration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate." 20 The
next step was the insertion of a new provision in the 1918 Act dealing
explicitly with powers of appointment. This provision defined the gross
estate as including "property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed in
contemplation of, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
14. Section 401.
15. The new statute will be discussed in Part II of this article.
16. Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b), (c).
17. Other omissions were dower and similar marital interests, and life insurance,
18. U. S. Treas. Reg. 37 (1916 ed.).
19. T. D. 2477, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 84 (1917), incorporated, in effect, in U. S.
Treas. Reg. 37, Art. XI (1917 ed.), and subsequently modified by T. D. 3088, 22 Treas.
Dec. Int. Rev. 491 (1920). T. D. 2477 contained the following puzzling language: "When
property is transferred by a special or limited power of appointment the question of taxa-
bility will depend upon the terms of the instrument by which the donee of the power-the
appointor- acts. The facts, in every such case should be reported fully to the Commis-
sioner in order that decision as to tax liability may be made." It seems that property sub-
ject to a special power was considered taxable, depending upon the circumstances, which
were not stated.
20. This provision is discussed in 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.02.
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at or after, his death; except in a case of a bona fide sale for a fair con-
sideration in money or money's worth." 2' The House Report 2 accom-
panying the amendment stated that it was enacted "for the purpose of
clarifying rather than extending the existing statute." It emphasized that
a donee of a general power is at the date of death "in a position not un-
like" that of an owner, and that there is "no reason why the privilege
which he exercises should not be taxed in the same degree as other prop-
erty over which he exercises the same authority." The Report's final
words were addressed to the evils of avoidance engendered by the 1916
Act: "The absence of a provision including property transferred by
powers of appointment makes it possible. by resorting to the creation of
such a power, to effect two transfers of an estate with the payment of
only one tax."'
Despite the fact that the 1918 amendment purported to clarify -' rather
than alter the existing statute, the regulations " issued thereafter drew
a line between the powers taxable under the 1916 Act and tho se taxable
under the 1918 Act. Taxability under the former Act depended "upon
whether the property was subject to the claims of the creditors of the
appointor, in preference to the person or persons in whi tse favor the p I\ver
was exercised." 2 The regulations assumed that appointive property was
generally so subject, recognizing, however, that the amenability of such
assets to claims of the donee's creditors was determined by local prop-
erty lawY.2  Although subsection (a) of the 191o Act provided, at least
21. Revenue Act of 1918, §402(e). Subsections (b) and (f) cof the same section
provided for the inclusion in the tax base of dower and similar marital interests, and life
insurance. Section 811(g), the present provision relating to life insurance, Ias been
amended by section 404 of the 1942 act.
22. H. R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1918) 21-22: 1939-2 Cmr. IL. II,
23. The Report was surprisingly subdued. As a matter sf fact, under the 1910 Act
it was possible to avoid estate tax forever by simply setting in motion a succession of gen-
eral powers to appoint by deed or will. Under the Rule against Perpetuities such a
power "is valid if the donee must acquire the power within the periid of perpetuities"
and "the validity of the appointment is determined by recko.,ning tile period of perpetui-
ties from the date of creation of the power." Leach, Pcrpetileis in a Ntishcll (1933)
51 HARv. L. RE:v. 638, 653, 654. Thus A may create a life estate for his child B. at the
same time bestowing upon B a general power to appint b'y dtcd ,r will. V may di the
same for his offspring, and following generations may do likewise. ,ee Comment 1,1937)
50 -Ltiv. L. REv. 938, 945, in connection with the delegation of pswers.
24. Compare United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 265 (1921). Compare with respect
to dower, 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.02.
25. U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30 (1919 ed.). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30
(1921 ed.).
26. U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 31 (1919 ed.). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 31,
(1921 ed.).
27. See T. D. 3088, 22 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 491 (1920). Nut all state, have embraced
the English rule that the creditors of a donee exercising a general puw-r can rvach the
appointed assets. O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231. See 3 IxsrrT.UN;r, Peei -
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52: 290
formally, that taxable property had to be subject to administration ex-
penses incurred by the decedent's estate and to distribution as part of his
estate, as well as subject to claims against the decedent, the Treasury
apparently deemed it sufficient if only the latter condition was satisfied."8
The Treasury's attempt to reach powers of appointment via section
202(a) collapsed very shortly in United States v. Field."0  A unanimous
Court held that property taxable under that provision had to meet the
following conditions "expressed conjunctively": the property had to be
an interest of the decedent at the date of his death; the property had to be
subject to the payment of charges against his estate and administration
expenses; and the property had to be subject to distribution as part of his
estate. Although under local law the property may have been subject to
the claims of the donee's creditors, it was not, according to the Court, the
donee's property. Furthermore, the appointive property was not dis-
tributable as part of the donee's estate.3" Thus by first assuming that an
interest in property was a necessary condition to tax, and then defining
"interest" as property owned by the decedent, the Court read all powers
out of subsection (a). In this interpretation of the statute the Court pur-
sued the well-worn path of the classical dogma that "the appointee takes
from the donor of the power, not from the donee, even though the power
is general." "' While one cannot quarrel very much with the Court's
ERTY (1940) § 329; 1 SlaEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 265; 3 TIFFANY, REAL P0'-
mTY (3d ed. 1939) § 710; Sines, supra note 10, at 504; Comment (1942) 41 Mica. L.
REv. 289; (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 538, 539, n. 7. In Massachusetts it has been held that
this rule applies even though the donor expressly provides that the donee's creditors can-
not reach the assets. State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N. E. (2d) 25
(1939), 52 HARv. L. REv. 1018. See Comment (1942) 41 MicH. L. REv. 302. In some
states the rights of creditors have been further increased by statute. See I GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) § 159; Comment (1941)
27 VA. L. REv. 1052, 1059.
28. See THURBER, FEDERAL ESTATE TAX (1921) 72.
29. 255 U. S. 257 (1921). Cf. Emmons V. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N. E. 1033
(1898) ; Thompson, supra note 8, 26 IowA L. REv. at 551.
30. See Ebersole v. McGrath, 271 Fed. 995 (S. D. Ohio 1920), dismissed pursaut to
stipulation, 272 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921). Cf. Lederer v. Pearce, 266 Fed, 497
(C. C. A. 3d, 1920), reaching a similar result but on a basis which might support a tax
under other circumstances. The regulations issued after the Field decision provided that
if "the decedent died prior to the effective date of the Revenue Act of 1918, the value
of the appointed property is not to be so included." U. S. Treas. Reg. 63, Art, 26.
31. L& cH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1940) 580. Pro-
fessor Leach continues: "Anyone can see that in a good many cases this concept flies in
the face of common sense. Much of the law of powers is concerned with resolving the
conflict between common-law theory and the practicalities of various situations that
arise . . . " See also id. at 654; (1938) 15 PROC. A. L. I. 279. Cf. Simes, Fifty Years
of Future Interests (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 749, 772: "Looked at broadly, it would
seem that the major trend in the law of powers is one toward a recognition of the power
as ownership rather than as a mere mandate. By that statement, it must not be inferred
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general view that subsection (a) expressed conjunctive conditions, 2
a more sympathetic Court would have noticed that its statement of those
conditions hardly did justice to the statutory language. The provision,
if read in a "reasonable" manner, imposed tax upon an interest in prop-
erty which was subject to payment of charges against the decedent's
estate, payment of administration expenses, and distribution as part of
his estate.' Property transferred by a general power could very well
satisfy these conditions. For example, a donee exercising a general
power might expressly subject the appointive property to liability for
claims against the estate and administration expenses, and blend the ap-
pointive property with his individual property so that all the assets would
be distributable as part of his estate.34 The Court, however, changed the
tenor of the statute by its manner of paraphrasing.
After the decision in the Field case the Treasury apparently handled
powers of appointment exclusively under the provision specifically defin-
ing their taxable status. This provision, amended at various times in
several comparatively unimportant respects, emerged in the Internal Rev-
enue Code as section 811(f), reading as follows:
"To the extent of any property passing under a general power of
appointment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed
executed in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death, or (3) by deed under which
he has retained for his life or any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death (A) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or (B) the right, either alone or in
conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; 3 except
that a power is ownership; but only that the tendency is to treat the donee as if he were
owner in a larger number of situations than fifty years ago!' See further Covington,
spra note 10, at 265. The dogma ties in with the doctrine of "relation back." For the
development of this doctrine, see 1 Sn , op. cit. mipra note 27, § 263. Even at common
law the latter doctrine is not always literally applied. Marlborough v. Godolphin, 2 Ves.
Sr. 61 (CI. 1750). See 3 RvsTATEmE-T, PRoPEaTy (1940) 1811, and compare criticism
in McDougal, supra note 1, at 1106.
32. But cf. Griswold, supra note 8, at 930, n. 10.
33. Compare Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 58-9 (1930).
34. Compare In re Twitchell's Estate, 284 Pa. 135, 130 AtI. 324 (1925) ; In rc For-
ney's Estate, 280 Pa. 282, 124 At. 424 (1924) ; It re McCord's Estate, 276 Pa. 459, 120
At. 413 (1923). See Comment (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1025, 1027; (1941) 41 CoL L
REv. 538. However, this possible interpretation of the 1916 Act does not contradict the
Court's assertion that the 1918 amendment was not merely clarifying. The regulations, in
effect, conceded that the amendment did more than clarify by setting up two categories
of powers for tax purposes. See discussion at p. 299 mpra.
35. Clause 3 was inserted by the Revenue Act of 1932, § 803(b), in conjunction with
§ 803(a) relating to similar inter vivos transfers made by an al'sute owner of property.
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in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration a1 in
money or money's worth . . ." 87
AN INEFFECTIVE STATUTE
The Power Must be Exercised
The old statute presents an interesting paradox. While designed to
forestall tax avoidance, or at least to impose tax if a certain dispositive
device is employed, the statute in reality is a standing invitation to
avoidance."8 A mere reading discloses that it does not apply unless the
power of appointment is exercised by the decedent-donee.80 Since takers in
default are generally those who would receive the property if the power
were exercised, there is no appreciable countervailing motive to exer-
cise the power.40
The changes made by § 803(a) grew out of the Supreme Court decisions in May v.
Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931) ;
Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931).
See 1 PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 299, 333.
36. The phrase "an adequate and full consideration" replaced "a fair consideration"
in the Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(f).
37. At this late date there are clearly no constitutional doubts with respect to this
provision, whether the power was created before or after the Revenue Act of 1918. Lee
v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932) ;
Stratton v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931), cerl. denied, 284 U. S.
651 (1931); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A.
3d, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1929) ; Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives
v. Lederer, 292 Fed. 629 (E. D. Pa. 1921) ; Harry J. Brown, 38 B. T. A. 298 (1938) ;
James C. Webster, 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938). See discussion in 1 PAUL, op. cit, supra note
4, § 9.05.
38. See Lewis Spencer Morris, 39 B. T. A. 570 (1939), where the decedent refrained
from exercising a power because of tax consequences. This criticism, as well as others
which follow, is confined to a power bestowed upon a donee by another person. A power
to appoint reserved by one transferring property by trust or otherwise falls within sub.
sections (c) and (d) of section 811, which are not similarly defective and consequently are
not ineffective. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 9.03. Nevertheless there are decisions
which erroneously treat reserved powers under subsection (f), sometimes with odd results.
See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Walde-
mar R. Helmholz, 28 B. T. A. 165 (1933), aff'd, 75 F. (2d) 245 (App. D. C. 1934), aff'd,
296 U. S. 93 (1935). See also Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 578 (1935) ; Minis v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 58 (1928),
cert. denied, 278 U. S. 657 (1929) ; Edward J. Hancy, 17 B. T. A. 464 (1929). Cf. Agnes
Davis Exton, 33 B. T. A. 215, 222 (1935) ; Bank of New York and Trust Co., 21 B. T, A.
197, 204 (1930) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.19. In this connection, see CoNF, REP. No.
2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 71 (Amendment No. 418).
39. See Estate of Isabella C. Hoffman, 3 B. T. A. 1361 (1926); Pennsylvania Co.
for Insurances on Lives v. Lederer, 292 Fed. 629. 630-31 (E. D. Pa. 1921),
40. Compare Schuyler, Powers of Appointnent and Especially Special Powers: The
Estate Tavpayer's Last Stand (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 771, 775; Covington, supra note
10, at 279.
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Aside from the avoidance aspects of the situation, it seems clear that
"failing to exercise a general power is one way of exercising it." 41 A
donee of a general power is endowed with a broad appointive discretion
which for tax purposes, at least, is equivalent to outright ownership of
the property. "To make a distinction between a general puwer and a
limitation in fee, is to grasp at a shadow while the substance escapes." 42
In refraining from formal exercise the donee is actually exercising the
discretionary authority conferred upon him. He may be ratifying the
choice made by the donor, but the quality of the choice is nt longer the
same. At the donor's death it is tentative; at tlhe donee's death it is final
and conclusive.4" The donee's failure to exercise his power is hardly re-
moved from the absolute owner's failure to devise his individual estate.
An exercise certainly possesses no peculiar attribute which calls for the
differentiation.44 To argue that a non-exercise constitutes a "failure tto
exercise a privilege" '5 is merely to toy with words. The donee enjoys a
power to dispose of the property according to his understanding of the
proprieties. As long as he "has the power of appointment, lie is in con-
trol of the succession." 4 If he is satisfied with the tentative remainder
disposition, there is no need to be troubled with a formal exercise. He
has nevertheless exercised his discretion and therefore his "privilege." 47
41. Lowndes, Tax Avoidance and the Federal Estate Tax (1940) 7 LAw & Coru!Ip.
PRoB. 309, 322. Compare Stone, J., in Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S.
327, 338 (1929) : "And the non-exercise of the power may be as much a disposition of
property testamentary in nature as would be its exercise at death .... ." See also State
v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 232 N. V. 331 (1930) ; 1 PAUL, op. cit. sulfta ntute 4, § 9.13;
Lowndes, The Constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax (1933) 20 VA. L Rnv. 141,
165; Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32
COL. L. Rtv. 1332, 1362; Comment (1940) 39 Micn. L. REv. 302, 307. But cf. LLmwn,
supra note 31, at 963, contending that a tax confined to an exercised power draws "a
sensible line"; and Angell, The Impact of the Law of Powers Upon our Internal Revenue
Laws (1941) 39 MICH. L. RFmv 1269, 1284-85.
42. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 630 (1916), quoting SvGPoi::. Powuns (8th
ed. 1861) 396. More recently the Supreme Court has emphasized that "for purposes
of estate and inheritance taxation, the power to dispose of property at death is the equiva-
lent of ownership." Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U. S. 657, 660 (1942). See, in addition,
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 371 (1939) ; Chase National Bank v. United States,
278 U. S. 327, 338 (1929). Cf. Attorney-General v. Upton, L. R. 1 Ex. 224, 229 (1866).
43. Compare Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 592, 93 N. E. 973, 975 (1911).
44. See Montague v. State, 163 Wis. 58, 61, 157 N. ,V. 508, 509 (1916), holding that
"the failure to act equally affects the course of the succession, and until such failure is
complete the succession is not fully determined." See further Burnham v. Stevens, 212
Mass. 165, 98 N. E. 603 (1912). Compare with respect to non-tax matters, Comment
(1942) 55 HALv. L. REv. 1025, 1028.
45. See Angell, supra note 41, at 1283-84.
46. Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 583, 592, 93 N. E. 973, 975 (1911).
47. Compare McDougal, supra note 1, at 1110: "Both donor and donee, whether
the power is 'exercised' or not exercised, are equally participants in the factual events
which send the property to its ultimate takers. They both do something: the donor signs
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While it is generally said that local law determines whether or not a
power of appointment has been exercised, 48 this statement of principle does
not mean that the local concept or understanding of "exercise" governs the
interpretation of the term for federal purposes. One word may cover the
skin of more than one idea. 9 It was obviously not intended that the mean-
ing of "exercise" should vary from state to state. For example, the
Restatement, graciously borrowing from tax law for the benefit of prop-
erty law, declares that creditors cannot reach property subject to a gen-
eral power if the appointees receive interests identical with those allotted
to them as takers in default.50 The Restatement rationalizes, with the
appropriate caveats, that an appointment which fails to divest a taker in
default of the interest bestowed upon him by the donor is not an exercise;
the donee "does not exercise his power to alter the donor's disposition
but merely declares his intention not to alter it." "' On the other. hand,
the Supreme Court has held in Helvering v. Grinnell 52 that in similar
circumstances a power is exercised within the meaning of the federal
statute, although the exercise, for other reasons, does not entail estate tax
consequences. The Grinnell case goes even further, for it is permissible
to read the opinion as holding that a power is exercised even though the
appointees renounce their shares under the appointment." "Exercise,"
a document which gives the 'power' to the donee; and the donee, who up to the moment
of his death can send the property wherever he pleases, by speaking sends it to certain
appointees or by remaining silent lets it go to certain default takers or by the donor's
intestacy." Cf. 1 SimEs, op. cit. supra note 27, § 255. See also Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Doughton, 189 N. C. 50, 54, 126 S. E. 176, 178 (1925), rev'd, 272 U. S. 567 (1926).
The opinion of the Supreme Court, dealing with multiple state taxation, has been over-
ruled in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U. S. 657 (1942). But cf. Matter of Vanderbilt, 281
N. Y. 297, 309, 22 N. E. (2d) 379, 387 (1939), aff'd sub norn. Whitney v. State Tax Com-
mission, 309 U. S. 530 (1940).
48. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 9.14; Griswold, supra note 8, at 944.
49. Compare Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425 (1918); Chafee, The Disorderly
Conduct of Words (1941) 41 CoL L. REV. 381; Cheatham, Book Review (1941) 55
HARV. L. REv. 164. For further discussions as to the effect of local law generally, see
1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1.10 and SELECTED STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATION, SECOND
SERIS (1938) 1; Comment (1941) 55 HARv. L. REv. 255.
50. 3 REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 327, comment b. Cf. Potter's Estate, 13 D. &
C. 667 (Pa. 1930). But see the lament by Moorehead, Book Review (1941) 20 Tax. L.
REv. 252, 255.
51. 3 RESTATEENT, PRoPERTY (1940) § 369, comment a. See also (1937-38) 15 PRoc.
A. L. I. 296; RESTATE MENT, PROPERTY (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1938) 151 (Messrs.
Powell and Simes dissenting at 155). While the Restatement declares that creditors have
no rights to the appointive assets because the power is not exercised, it seems more real-
istic to state that the power remains unexercised because the creditors have no rights.
Whether they should be given rights in this situation is simply a policy matter. See dis-
cussion infra at 324.
52. 294 U. S. 153 (1935).
53. See discussion infra at 334.
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for federal tax purposes, apparently connotes a transfer by the donee of
an interest in property which would be legally effective if the donee were
absolute owner of the property and the legal prerequisites of an effective
appointment were applicable to a transfer by an absolute owner. Hence
it is unimportant whether an appointee derives more, less, or the same
benefits as compared with those conditionally granted to him as taker in
default.
5 4
Local law, however, impinges upon the question of exercise in various
ways. For instance, such law determines whether a general residuary de-
vise in the donee's will disposes of the appointive property. 5 The same is
true with respect to the validity of the testamentary act as affected by such
matters as the donee's capacity to exercise the power ' and the Rule
against Perpetuities." Or the effect of local law may involve a search for
the applicable principle in the realm of conflicts." In the absence of a bind-
ing local decree with respect to the property in question,"2 the Board " or
federal court attempts "to forecast" 1 how a state court would react to the
54. To date this interpretation has been of little practical importance to the Gov-
erment. See discussion infra at 318.
55. See Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), cert. denicid,
296 U. S. 578 (1935) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A.
1st, 1934) ; Carrie L. Jones, 41 B. T. A. 1279 (1940) ; Emma .S. Cone, 31 B. T. A. 515
(1934). Compare, in regard to special powers, Biddle's Estate, 333 Pa. 316, 5 A. (2d) 158
(1939).
56. See Estate of Zachary Smith Reynolds, 42 B. T. A. 145 (1940), aff'd sub now.
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 121 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 4th,
1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U. S. 56 (1942).
57. See Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; Estate
of Gertrude Budmell Day, 44 B. T. A. 524 (1941); John S. Montgomezy, 17 B. T. A.
491 (1929).
58. See, e.g., Estate of Zachary Smith Reynolds, 42 B. T. A. 145 (1940), aff'd sub
nor. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 121 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A.
4th, 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 316 U. S. 56 (1942) ; and discussion in 1 PAUL, op.
cit. spra note 4, § 9.23.
59. At times there is no need to ex-amine local statutes and decisions if a local decree
has determined the question of exercise with respect to the particular power involved
and such decree is deemed conclusive by the federal tribunal. See Estate of Cassius E.
Wakefield, 44 B. T. A. 677 (1941); Union & Peoples National Bank, 30 B. T. A. 1277
(1934); cf. John S. Montgomery, 17 B. T. A. 491 (1929). In Potter's Estate, 13 D. & C.
667 (Pa. 1930), a decree of nonexercise was obtained for federal estate tax purposes.
On the tax effects of local decrees generally see 1 PAuL, op. cit. sr pra note 4, § 1.11;
Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions (1942)
51 YALE L. J. 783.
60. The Revenue Act of 1942, § 504, has changed the name of the Board of Tax
Appeals to "The Tax Court of the United States." However, the former name is em-
ployed throughout this paper for purposes of convenience.
61. See Estate of Mary Adele Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408, 414 (1938). Cf. John Fred-
erick Lewis, Jr., 1 T. C. No. 57 (1943), where the Board would have welcomed a local
decree. In view of Helvering v. Stuart, 63 Sup. Ct. 140 (U. S. 1942), the Supreme Court
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same question. In any event it is clear that the requirement of exercise en-
tails a study of local law which is not supported by any persuasive policy
considerations. The same control at death may produce varying results,
depending upon the jurisdiction involved. While the revenue system can-
not be divorced from local law, since such law creates legal rights arid de-
fines their scope and limitations,"2 there is no need to expand the import-
ance of local principles beyond the point where they respond to a reason-
able tax rationale.
The recent decision by the Supreme Court in Helveringj v. Safe De-
posit &" Trust Company of Baltimore ": indicates that an exercise
is not a private matter between the donee and local law. Those who
survive may affect both the devolution and the tax. Confusion results,
however, in determining to what extent the acts of the survivors have
affected the validity of the exercise. For example, when the takers in
default or those who regard themselves as such challenge the donee's
appointment, it is not unusual for the quarreling parties to effect a com-
promise allowing the appointment to stand in part and transferring the
remaining portion of the property to the contestants. If such a settlement
is made the following alternative results compete for recognition :0 the
entire property is free from tax; the portion of the appointment per-
mitted to remain infact is taxable; or the entire property is taxable re-
gardless of the subsequent changes.
In the Safe Deposit case the donee had exercised his power of appoint-
ment in favor of his brother and sisters. Thereafter the representatives
of the donee's children attacked the validity of the appointment, claiming
that the property belonged to the children as takers in default. The claim
of the appointees was based upon the alleged validity of the appointment
and, in the alternative, upon alleged rights in their favor as takers in
default. The issues were complicated by other factors, such as legitimacy
and the validity of a divorce, 5 but eventually a judicially approved settle-
ment was reached whereby 372 percent of the property was allocated
seems to be committed to the position that if local law is obscure, the determination of
such law by the circuit court of appeals will not be reversed unless the Supreme Court is
brought "to a conviction of error" on the part of the lower court.
62. See 1 PAUL, oP. cit. supra note 4, at 69.
63. 316 U. S. 56 (1942).
64. It is assumed that the requirement for passing is satisfied. See discussion infra
at 318.
65. The factors are fully set forth in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 615,
182 S. E. 341, 363 (1935); Estate of Zachary Smith Reynolds, 42 B. T. A. 145, 152
(1940). See also the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in Helvering v. Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 121 F. (2d) 307, 314 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941). Another factor
was a settlement in trust for the decedent's first wife and child, which was incorporated
in a judgment. There were further complications because of North Carolina's claim for
inheritance taxes.
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to the appointees. A bare majority of the Court held that the portion of
the appointment left intact was taxable to the extent that it was rooted
in the claim based on the validity of the appointment. It was, therefore,
necessary to determine how much of the property allocated to the brother
and sisters was attributable to their claim based on the appointment and
how much was attributable to their claim as takers in default. The case
was remanded to the Board for a determination of this issue, with due
recognition that at most the Board's decision would be "a rough esti-
mate" and "an approximation derived from the evaluation of elements not
easily measured." "
The prevailing opinion relied upon the decisions in Lyeth v. Hoey cT and
Helvering v. Grinnell.8 In the former case the Court had held that prop-
erty received by an heir pursuant to a compromise of a will contest was
acquired by inheritance and was, therefore, not taxable income."9 On that
occasion the Court had emphasized that any distinction between acquisition
under a judicial decree of invalidity and an acquisition pursuant to settle-
ment was "too formal to be sound." 70 It was argued in the Safe Deposit
case, however, that subsequent events should not be permitted to influ-
ence estate tax liability.7 ' The majority countered with the response that
the decision in the Griwnell case expressly recognized the effect of events
after death.72 According to the minority, Lycth v. Hoey was irrelevant
in the present context because there the taxpayer received a portion of the
property in his capacity as heir, whereas here nothing passed by virtue of
the exercise.
Undoubtedly, as the majority points out, if the exercise had been
eventually sustained in the state courts, the appointed property would have
been taxed in its entirety. On the other hand, a determination that the
exercise was invalid would have freed the entire property from tax.73 In
66. 316 U. S. at 66.
67. 305 U. S. 183 (1938).
68. The minority also relied on the Grinnell case.
69. Compare Muriel Paul, The Federal Tax Status of Will Contestan s, in PAUL,
op. cit. supra note 49, at 305, published before the Supreme Court's opinion in Lyeih v.
Hoey.
70. 305 U. S. at 196.
71. In Lyeth v. Hoey the property was immune from income tax whether received
by the legatee or contesting heir.
72. Compare Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929) (involving a
valuation issue); Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), ecri. denicd,
63 Sup. Ct. 257 (U. S. 1942). See 2 PAUTL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 18.43. Aside from the
Grinnell case it is clear that events after death may affect estate tax liability. Adminis-
tration expenses are a common example. See also note 75 infra.
73. The circuit court of appeals, relying upon a local decree, had treated the e.xer-
case as invalid. 121 F. (2d) at 314. The Board had done likewise, although admitting
that there was no conclusive adjudication. 42 B. T. A. at 160. The majority opinion in
the Supreme Court held to the contrary on the basis of the opinion of the highest court,
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the Safe Deposit case the question of validity was disposed of by an essen-
tially private settlement, despite formal approval by the courts.14 It is
arguable that since a settlement is no more determinative of legal rights
than a litigant's interpretation of the applicable law,"5 the Board and fed-
eral courts should still determine the validity of an appointment under
local law, regardless of a decree which is consensual in character.70 Other-
wise an estate tax liability may be created by agreement subsequent to the
decedent's demise.7
The Supreme Court's decision in the Safe Deposit case leads to the
conclusion that the exercise of the power is valid as to one portion of the
property and invalid as to the other, although there is but one testamen-
tary act. This conclusion is justifiable where the appointment made is
partially invalid because of some substantive provision or because the
which "gave clear recognition to the alleged validity of the decedent's attempted appoint-
ment as a basis of the claim the brother and sisters asserted." 316 U. S. at 66.
The alternatives stated above do not allow for the possibility that since tile ap-
pointees also asserted rights as takers in default the appointed shares did not "pass" under
the rule of the Grinnell case and were therefore tax-exempt. See discussion infra at 318.
A decision on this possibility would seem to require an additional examination of local
law to determine whether the appointees were actually the takers in default as claimed.
The compromise is no more entitled to the final word in this case than it is on the sub-
ject of exercise. The decision of the majority apparently accords no recognition to the
possibility of applying the Grinnell case except, perhaps, to the extent that the Board is
ordered to include only that portion of the property finally received by the brother and
sisters which is attributable to their claim as appointees rather than their alternative
claim as takers in default. But if the brother and sisters were nevertheless the takers in
default under local law even this portion of the property should not be taxed unless the
Grimnell case applies only if the appointees renounce the benefits of the appointment.
Such a renunciation did not take place here. The Court's general disregard of the "pass-
ing" problem which is implicit in the case may derive from its assumption that the Grin-
nell decision is based exclusively upon a renunciation. See discussion infra at 334.
74. See 42 B. T. A. at 166.
75. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 73 F. (2d) 970 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934).
Compare, however, the cases holding that where a charitable legatee conveys to the de-
cedent's heir a portion of its legacy in compromise of a will contest, the deduction is
limited to the amount retained by charity. Thompson's Estate v. Commissioner, 123 F.
(2d) 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Sage v. Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 3d,
1941), cert denied, 314 U. S. 699 (1942); accord, E. T. 17, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 231.
Here, of course, another consideration is involved; the desire to limit the deduction to
amounts actually devoted to charitable ends. Compare, further, the old dower cases dis-
cussed in 1 PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 4, § 5.02.
76. Note the suggestion made in 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 443-44: The tax
consequences should be based upon the actual disposition agreed to by the interested par-
ties unless the case is one "of clear and valid exercise, where the subsequent agreement
is nothing but an ex post facto transaction inter vivos, that is to say, where there are in
reality three different transfers, from the donor to the donee, from the donee to the
appointee, and'from the latter to persons participating in the agreement."
77. Compare Estate of Zachary Smith Reynolds, 42 B. T. A. 145, 173 (1940). But
see (1942) 40 MicH. L. REv. 1270, 1272.
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formal requirements with respect to personalty differ from those imposed
in regard to realty. But no such factors came into play here. Instead
the triers of the facts were instructed to determine how much of the
appointment remained because of insistence upon its validity and how
much survived due to the other' claim. As a practical matter, of course,
the burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer and, in the event of doubt,
the valuation decision should veer in the direction of the Government1 s
The minority was at a loss to understand how the Board, in determining
the taxable portion, could calculate the relative 'weight and influence of
the various considerations underlying the settlement in the precise lan-
guage of mathematics." Nor does the majority, in the Safe Deposit case,
indicate the criteria for such valuation. The Board can do no more tham
guess.80
The Power Alust be General
An additional avenue of tax avoidance is presented by the statutory
requirement that the power must be general "I to render the appi inted prop-
erty taxable. The statute does not define a general power. But courts
have been known to hear voices when others have been oppressed by
78. Compare Robinette v. Helvering, 63 Sup. Ct. 540 (U. S. 1943). This problem
is probably even more difficult than that raised by contemplation of death cases, where the
court's task is merely to determine the dominant or substantial motive fs r the transfer.
See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6.06.
79. Compare discussion infra at 329.
80. See Humes v. United States, 276 U. S. 487, 494 (1928). According to judge
Frank, value in tax law "as almost alvrays . . . involves a conjecture, a guess, a pre-
diction, a prophesy." But a guess as such does not necessarily disclose value; it must,
at least, be "educated." Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943, 946 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942). Compare United States v. State Street Trust Co., 124 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st,
1942), requiring the Board to consider the contingency of remarriage as a valuation fac-
tor, with Robinette v. Helvering, 63 Sup. Ct. 540 (U. S. 1943), holding that the contin-
gency of marriage is beyond the actuarial art, ignoring Brotherhood v. Pinkston, 293 U. S.
96 (1934), which held that the e-pectancy of remarriage could be valued and "the law of
averages applies in respect of that event, as it does in respect of death and of other
events.' It may be that for valuation purposes there is some significant distinction be-
tween marriage and remarriage.
81. A statute so limited seems to reflect a basic attitude toward powers which per-
meates all thought on the subject. This attitude may be summarized as follows: (1) a
power is general or special [but see Gold, The Classification of Some Pow'ers of Appoint-
nient (1942) 40 MlicH. L. Rrv. 337] ; (2) this differentiation "is no technician's formal-
ism but represents a profound difference of attitude in the donor;" (3) a donee of a
general power enjoys "practical ownership" whereas a donee of a special power occupies
a "quasi-fiduciary position" with respect to the appointive property; and (4) the fore-
going difference in position requires a distinction in governing legal principles. See
LE&cE, op. cit. supra note 31, at 577; and also 3 REsTmAEE.:T, Pnormnr (1940) 1813.
Compare Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) C00, 604 (C. C. A.
3d, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1929) ; Leser v. Buret, 46 F. (2d) 756, 759 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1931). See, in another connection, In re Bradshaw, [1902] 1 Ch. 436, 447.
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legislative silence. 82  The statute is obviously intended to convey some
message to those who must apply it, and it is reasonable to assume that
the drafters probably relied upon some prevailing common law notions to
serve for tax purposes. Since they employed a conveyancer's term, it may
be reasoned that "legislative intention" riust receive "a property lawyer's
interpretation." 83 But since in the final analysis the search is for "inten-
tion," 84 a term of art in the law of property may actually function
as a cloak for some economic concept."" Moreover, property concepts are
not as clean-cut as is often supposed. Here, also, there are the inevitable
twilight zones,86 and concepts are fashioned in the light of the purpose
they are intended to serve.8 T
A general power is usually defined as a power to appoint to anyone,
including the donee, in contrast to a special power, commonly defined as a
power to appoint within a designated class or among designated indi-
viduals85 In 1919 the regulations described a general power as "one to
appoint to any person or persons in the discretion of the donee." " They
also declared that appointive property was not includible in the donee's
gross estate if he "is required to appoint to a specified person or class of
persons." "o A change was made in 1924 by prefacing the definition of a
general power with the word "ordinarily." " And in 1937 a further
82. Perhaps it is more correct to add that often the courts nust hear voices. See,
e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939), where the Government
heard conflicting voices and the Court had to make its choice.
83. Compare Attorney-General v. Mitchell, 6 Q. B. D. 548, 553, 555 (1881) ; Schuy-
ler, supra note 40, at 774-75, 776-77.
84. See United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
Cf. 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 87.
85. Compare United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399, 402 (1941), involving "future
interests" under the gift tax.
86. See FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936) 208.
87. Compare text infra at 317. See Helvering v. Enright, 312 U. S. 636, 643 (1941).
88. See, e.g., LEACH, op. cit. upra note 31, at 577; SUCDEN, PowERs (8th ed, 1861)
394; FARWELL, POWERS (2d ed. 1893) 7; KALES, FuruRs INTFRESTS (2d ed. 1920) § 609;
CHEsHIRE, T E MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1937) 494; Gray, Release and
Discharge of Powers (1911) 24 HAgv. L. REv. 511, 512; Leach, supra note 9, at 808;
Covington, supra note 10, at 263; Comment, Developments in the Law--Future Interests
-1932-1934 (1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 1202, 1239. In a number of instances the definitions
exclude the donee from the designated class. Compare the definition of powers which vest
in the trustee in bankruptcy: "powers which he might have exercised for his own betnc-
fit, but not those which he might have exercised solely for some other person." 52 STAT.
879, 880 (1938), 11 U. S .C. § 110 (1940).
89. U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30 (1919 ed.). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30
(1921 ed.) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 25.
90. Strictly speaking, this language seems to be limited to a power which must be
exercised by the donee. The Treasury, however, is not interested in the mandatory or
discretionary character of the power.
91. U. S. Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 24. See also U. S. Treas, Reg. 70, Art. 24 (1926
ed.) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 24 (1929 ed.) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 24 (1934 ed.).
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change was effected by providing that a power is general, "however limited
as to the persons or objects in whose favor the appointment may be made,"
if it "is exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, or his creditors." 0'
This definition has been continued in the latest regulations, which have
recently been amended to provide, in addition, that "a power of appoint-
ment exercisable to meet the estate tax, and any other taxes, debts, or
charges which are enforceable against the estate is included within the
meaning of a power of appointment exercisable in favor of the deced-
ent's estate or the creditors of his estate." 94
The Supreme Court has observed that under a general pow er, as
usually understood, "the donee may appoint to anyone, including his o,,n
estate or his creditors, thus having as full dominion over the property
as if he owned it." " This statement is adequate for federal estate tax
purposes in at least two types of cases. First, a power is considered gen-
eral when the donee is unrestricted in his choice of appointees even though
it is exercisable only by will." A donee of such a power obviously cannot
appoint the property to himself during his lifetime, but at the moment
of death his power to route the property is as great as that of a testator
disposing of his individual property."7 Second, a power to appoint to any
92. U. S. Treas. Reg. S0, Art. 24 (1937 ed.). Simultaneously the following language
vwas dropped: "If the donee is required to appoint to a specified person or class of per-
sons, the property should not be included in his gross estate."
93. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, Sec. 8124.
94. T. D. 5239, approved March 10, 1943. This Treasury decision also makes a num-
ber of verbal changes in section 81.24 as a result of section 403 of the 1942 Act, and adds
new provisions interpreting this section.
95. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 81 (1940).
96. See Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. dcnied, XR5
U. S. 563 (1932); Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Blaclburne v.
Brown, 43 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. fc-
Caughn, 34 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1939) ; Whit-
lock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927). See also Brown, v. Fidel-
ity Union Trust Co., 126 N. 3. Eq. 406, 9 A. (2d) 311 (1939). Compare, however,
Christine Smith Kendrick, 34 B. T. A. 1040, 1042 (1936). This principle holds true even
though the property cannot be appointed to certain trust beneficiaries whose lives measure
the duration of the intervening trust. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34
F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1929). But cf. In re Dun-
bar-Buller, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 143, holding that a power is nongeneral .:hen the donee is
authorized to appoint to such uses as she desires by a will expressly referring to the
power. See, further, Phillips v. Cayley, 43 Ch. D. 222 (1889).
The generality of the power is not affected where its exercise is contingent upon the
occurrence of a certain condition if such condition has materialized at the date of death.
Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), ccrt. denied, 296 U. S.
578 (1935); J. Gilmore Fletcher, 29 B. T. A. 503 (1933), remanded on settlonent, 74 F.
(2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935); cf. In re Wilkinson, [1910] 2 Ch. 216. See 1 SuMs,
op. cit. supra note 27, § 246.
97. Compare, in another connection, Kales, General Powers and the Rude Again-st
Perpetuities (1912) 26 -ARv. L. R. 64, 67, 69; Thvrndike, General Powers and Per-
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person the donee selects is general although the appointive interest is less
than a fee." This conclusion is not affected by a local rule of property
treating such a power as nongeneral.90
Unfortunately, the term "general power" falters where firmness is of
the essence. Although it is commonly assumed that a power is either
general or special, the matter does not necessarily boil down to one of
mutually exclusive categories. There are powers which do not fit snugly
into the traditional groupings of "general" and "special." 100 The in-
completeness of the prevailing two-fold classification is indicated by the
Restatement, which fondly embraces the traditional dogmas relating to
powers.' 01 The Restatement observes that a power is general if "(a)
being exercisable before the death of the donee, it can be exercised wholly
in favor of the donee, or, (b) being testamentary, it can be exercised
wholly in favor of the estate of the donee." On the other hand, a power
is considered special if "(a) it can be exercised only in favor of persons,
not including the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large,
and (b) the donor does not manifest an intent to create or reserve the
power primarily for the benefit of the donee." '02 If these definitions are
read in par materia, it is clear that they are not all-inclusive. 03 For exam-
pie, a donee may possess a testamentary power to appoint to anyone other
petuities (1914) 27 HAiv. L. REV. 705, 713, 716; and Bettner, The Rule Against Per-
petuities as Applied to Powers of Appointment (1940) 27 VA. L. REV. 149, 176-77; with
Gray, General Testamentary Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuilies (1913) 26 HARV.
L. REV. 720.
98. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1929) ;
Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 287 (1934), reVd on other grounds, C. C.
A. 6th, June 12, 1935. In United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (1921), discussed supra
at 300, the appointive property was an income interest and the power was regarded as
general. But cf. 3 TiFFAN', REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 678, stating that a power
is "ordinarily referred to" as general if the donee can "appoint to any person, including
himself, and is not restricted as. to the estate or interest which he may appoint . .. .
99. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940). But cf. Waldemar R. Helm-
holz, 28 B. T. A. 165 (1933), criticized in 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 434; Gump,
The Meaning of "General" Powers of Appointment Under the Federal Estate Tax (1937)
1 MD. L. REV. 300, 309. See also Schuyler, supra note 40, at 778. It is clear, from the
Morgan case, that the character of a power for tax purposes is determined by federal
criteria although local law determines the content and scope of the power. See, in addi-
tion, Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760, 763 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; Leser v.
Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756, 761 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; cf. Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d)
399, 401 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932).
100. See 2 JARMAN, WILS (7th ed. 1930) 763. But compare the apparent assumption
in Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), and Charles J. Hepburn, 37
B. T. A. 459 (1938), that a power is either general or special.
101. See McDougal, supra note 1, at 1104 et seq.
102. 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 320.
103. Compare In re Park, [1932] 1 Ch. 580. See Gump, supra note 99, at 302.
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than himself, his estate or his creditors. 0 4 To denominate such a power
as special because the exception creates an appointive class designated by
the donor is to drain the word "class" of any sensible meaning.'
The Restatement describes the powers which are excluded by its defini-
tions as "hybrids," and dismisses them with the comment that "they are
so rare that it would not be useful to state the rules applicable tti them in
situations where the distinction between general and special powers is
significant." ' But the estate tax cannot indulge in a similar luxury of
ignoring the "hybrid" power.107 Once a traditional category becomes tlon
fuzzy at the edges, the route to avoidance is opened.108 In the ordinary
private law cases there is rarely any need to worry about the "hybrid"
power and to correlate it with traditional concepts,'0" as the strictly dis-
positive purposes of donors may be readily fulfilled via the accepted cate-
gories. The estate tax context is otherwise, for the n'in-typical puwer
may be most desirable from the tax point of view, and the language of the
statute is clearly no match for such powers if the cases to date are to be
our guide.
The Board has indicated that a power excluding one or more persons
from its'benefits is nongeneral if the excepted'person or a member of the
excepted group is living at the date of the donee's death."1 There
is also a faint hint that a power to appoint to any person other than a busi-
ness corporation is nongeneral."' Undoubtedly a donee's capacity to route
the appointive property is formally circumscribed if, for example, he may
designate anyone except A and his descendants as appointees. Neverthe-
less, does the exception really constitute a significant limitatiin upon the
104. Compare Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Estate of Sarah
P. White, C. C. H. 1942 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 12,522-G (BTA men.).
105. Compare Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756, 789 (Ex. 1840), affd, 3 Beav. 257
(Rolls Ct. 1841), aff'd sub now. Drake v. Attorney General, 10 CI. & F. 257 (H. L
1843). See Gold, supra note 81, at 338, 371.
106. 3 RESTATEmE-T, PROPEnTy (1940) §320, comment a.
107. Compare LEAcH, op. cit. supra note 31, at 577: "One may imagine a powver to
appoint among a class where the class is so large that the scope of appointment is prac-
tically unlimited, but freak notions are seldom indulged by persons creating powers:'
108. The benefits of fuzziness may operate in the opposite direction. Cf. Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). See PAuL, STUDms N Fn MEAL TAxAwTi':, TumD SuaEFs
(1940) 207; Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Ev ,ltion of the
Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YAiE L. J. 213.
109. Compare Gold, supra note 81, at 337.
110. See Christine Smith Kendrick, 34 B. T. A. 1040 (1936), disapproving the truly
remarkable opinion in Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 1 F. (2d) 987 (F. D. Pa. 1924).
Cf. Spanner, The Federal Estate Tax (1939) 17 TAXES 3, 4.
111. See Waldemar R. Helmholz, 28 B. T. A. 165 (1933), and criticisms in I PA UL, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 433-34. Cf. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 287 (1934),
rev'd on other grounds, C. C. A. 6th, June 12, 1935; J. Gilmore Fletcher, 29 B. T. A.
503 (1933), remanded on settlement, 74 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
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donee's discretion? 112 It has been intimated that the exception should be
evaluated in terms of real effectiveness. If the excepted person or per-
sons are natural objects of the decedent's bounty, the power should not be
regarded as general; on the other hand, if the limitation is merely formal,
excluding persons who obviously have no claim on the decedent's bounty,
the power should be considered general.1 13 However, this approach would
overlook an important aspect of powers of appointment. While the
excluded group may not be benefited directly by the power, the donee
enjoys greater freedom to use his individual property for their benefit
since the appointive property may be routed to the other objects of his
bounty." 4 At any rate, the distinction does not point to a line which is
feasible from a tax standpoint, for taxability is made to depend upon the
pattern disclosed by a variety of familial and financial circumstances,
In contrast to the Board's position, it is the theory of the present
regulations that a power is general, regardless of restrictions in the choice
of appointees, if it is exercisable in favor of the donee or his estate. There
is obviously no question but that a power to appoint to one's self, no mat-
ter how narrow the eligible class, is in substance a power to appoint as one
sees fit; "it can make no difference that this can only be done by two steps
instead of by one-namely, by an appointment to himself, followed by a
subsequent gift or disposition, instead of by a direct appointment to the
object or objects of his bounty." "' The regulations apparently proceed
one step further in providing that a power is general if exercisable in
favor of the estate. A power seems to fall within this category if the
donee's estate may derive economic benefits through an exercise of the
power. Such benefits are represented by the satisfaction of claims against
the estate, administration expenses, and federal estate and other death
taxes.-1 The regulations, accordingly, would pass beyond the usual con-
ception of a general power as an authority to appoint property to any
person selected by the donee.
11
112. The English courts have treated such a power as general for some purposes and
nongeneral for others. Compare Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & W. 756 (Ex. 1840), aff'd, 3 Beav.
256 (Rolls Ct 1841), aff'd sub non. Drake v. Attorney General, 10 Cl. & F. 257 (H. L.
1843) (legacy tax) ; Edie v. Babington, 3 Ir. Ch. R. 568 (Rolls Ct. 1854) (rights of donee's
creditors); with In re Byron's Settlement, [1891] 3 Ch. 474 (Wills Act, s. 27). Cf. It re
Wilkinson, [1910] 2 Ch. 216.
113. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433. Cf. Surrey and Aronson, supra note
41, at 1361-2; Gold, supra note 81, at 357.
114. Compare Whitney v. State Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530, 540 (1940).
115. In re Penrose, [1933] Ch. 793, 807. See 1 SIMES, op. cit. .supra note 27, at 434.
116. Compare U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, Sec. 81.26, relating to life insurance payable to
the executor, and the approval of this regulation in H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 162. See generally 1 PAUL, op. cit. spra note 4, § 10.23, and CLARKI,
TAXATION OF LIr INSURAN cE AND ANNUrTIES (1941) § 94.
117. 'The Restatement, like the regulations, indicates that a testamentary power is
general if it is exercisable in favor of the estate [3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940)
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A testamentary power to appoint to anyone other than the donee's cred-
itors has, however, proven extremely troublesome. In Leser v. Burnet ll
the Fourth Circuit held that such a power is not general.'" The donor
framed his grant of authority in terms which commonly create a general
power as usually understood, but the court decided that under the law
of Maryland the language employed was not sufficiently broad to include
the donee's creditors. 12c- Although the opinion is correct in asserting that
local law determines the scope of one's appointive authority, -2 it is not
§ 320], but the word "estate," as used by the Restatement, seems to clothe a different
concept, namely, a power to render the appointive property subject to such distribution
as the donee decides or to such distribution as he permits under the laws of intestacy.
And one element of such a power seems to be the authority to dispose of the property to
such persons as one sees fit to select. The Restatement, at one point (p. 1814) speaks of
a general testamentary power as a power to appoint to the donee's "estate or to any
other person whomsoever after his death." However, property concepts, whatever they
may be, are not necessarily final in interpreting a tax statute. See discussion supra at 310.
Professor Simes seems to imply that a power is exercisable in favor of the donce's estate
even though certain individuals are ineligible as objects. Sms, op. cit. supra note 27,
at 469.
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940), does not cast any doubt upon the
regulations, since the Court merely referred to the "usual" definitions, without any need
to probe beneath them. Aside from the prospective validity, at least, of the regulations
(see Griswold. supra note 8, at 941; cf. Schuyler, stpra note 40, at 777), one should
also note their implied approval in the committee reports on the 1942 amendments. H. IL
RuP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161, and Sms. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 234, referring to § 403(d) (1). See also Cw.. REP. No. 2526, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 71. These reports laconically describe as general "a power to
appoint in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate."
See, generally, as to the prospective validity of a change in regulations, American Chicle
Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 450 (1942) ; White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U. S.
32 (1942) ; Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428 (1941) ; Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co.,
308 U. S. 90 (1939). Cf. H-iggins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942),
cert. denied, 63 Sup. Ct. 57 (U. S. 1942).
118. 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
119. There is a similar assumption in Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760,
764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). The Board has referred to such a power as special in char-
acter. Christine Smith Kendrick, 34 B. T. A. 1040, 1043 (1936). See also Surrey and
Aronson, supra note 41, at 1361. Cf. 1 Snscs, op. cit. mipra note 27, § 246, to the effect
that a power to appoint to anyone except the donee or his estate might be deemed special.
120. If there are no creditors it seems that Leser v. Burnct is inapplicable since there
is no existing excepted group at the date of death. Cf. Christine Smith Kendrick, 34
B. T. A. 1040 (1936). On the other hand, if a power is exercisable only in favor of
creditors and there are none, it seems that there is no tax since there is no power. Cf.
Schuyler, supra note 40, at 793, n. 110.
121. See Merwin v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 171 Md. 346, 183 At.
803 (1937), (1938) 2 M. L. Rnv. 155, wherein it is assumed without any discussion that
a remainder to "such person or persons, in such shares and proportions, and upon and
for such estates and interests" as the donee should appoint gave rise to a general pawer.
Cf. Comment (1940) 4 MD. L. Rav. 297.
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necessarily correct in its interpretation of the term "general," especially
since the rule that creditors may reach property appointed tinder a gen-
eral power apparently applies even if the donor provides that the donee
shall in no circumstances appoint to the latter's creditors. 12 2 More im-
portant, however, is the practical result of the decision. The power con-
sidered in Leser v. Burnet is theoretically narrower than a general power
as usually conceived, but it may, economically speaking, be much more
valuable. Property subject to a completely unrestricted power may be
reached by the donee's creditors, depending upon the particular rule of
local law. 121 Yet the power in the Leser case is apparently immune front
creditors' claims and bestows an identical freedom to distribute property
among the objects of the donee's bounty.12 4 The economic advantages
are even greater under a statute which is confined to exercised general
powers. Exercise of such a power incurs the peril of death tax, yet the
Leser power may be freely exercised without any fear of tax.
The leaky character of the term "general" is further evidenced in the
case where a donor provides that the effective exercise of the donee's
power requires the consent of another person. For example, an unrestrict-
ed power to appoint, vested in a life tenant, may be exercisable with
the approval of a trustee. The Board has held such a power to be non-
general, emphasizing that the consent of the trustees is not "a mere
perfunctory, administrative act." 125 There are very few non-tax deci-
sions which cast light one way or the other. The English courts have
attempted to draw a neat line between a power in the other person to veto
an appointment 126 and a power in the other person to exercise discretion
in the choice of appointees.127 A rule poised upon such delicate distine-
122. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 329, comment c.
123. See note 27 supra. A Leser power should not be confused with a power to
appoint to anyone where the property cannot be reached by the donee's creditors under
the English rule. The donee of the latter power may nevertheless appoint the property
to his creditors if he so desires. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756, 762 (C. C. A. 4th,
1931). However, in Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164, 165 (C. C. A. 3d,
1927), the court seems to have the erroneous impression that a power is not general if
the donee's creditors cannot reach the appointive assets. See I PAUL, op. cit. slipra note
4, at 431, n. 9.
124. See Griswold, mpra note 8, at 957, n. 126.
125. Charles J. Hepburn, 37 B. T. A. 459, 466 (1938). At various times trustees
effectively interfered with the donee's plans. A similar view is indicated in Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), which builds upon a
fundamentally erroneous point of view. See note 38 supra, and criticism in 1 PAUL, op.
cit. mpra note 4, at 435. Cf. 1 SIiEs, op. cit. mspra note 27, at 432: "The power may be
general, but to be exercised only with the consent of another person."
126. See lt re Phillips, [1931] 1 Ch. 347; In re Joicey, 76 SOL. J. 459 (Ch. Div. 1932).
127. See In re Watts, [1931] 2 Ch. 302.
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tions 12s is extremely impracticable from a tax standpoint 122 and encour-
ages the requirement of approval by others in order to avoid tax."' The
decision of the Board, however, may be a temporary aberration in view
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Miorgan -,. Conimissioner,"'3  where
it was held that the authority of trustees to withhold property from an
appointee, pursuant to a spendthrift clause, did not render a power non-
general. 3 But it may still be argued that a donee possessed of a power
exercisable with the consent of another is hardly in the position of an
owner, to whom the donee of a general power was compared by the House
in proposing the 1918 statute.""
A court sufficiently tax-wise might adopt the following approach. While
the statute speaks only of general powers, there was obviously no inten-
tion to absorb all the subtleties of classification, including so-called "hy-
brid" powers. The more sensible view seems to be that the drafters
assumed the categories of "general" and "special" to embrace all possible
powers of appointment. In other words, while a particular power might
not, technically speaking, be deemed either "general" or "special," it should
be regarded as one or the other in the light of the basic desire to reach
powers approximating ownership. Hence a testamentary power to appoint
to anyone except certain persons might be deemed general."' The same
128. Compare (1939) 83 Sot. J. 67, (1935) 79 So.. J. 447. See in addition, In re
Dilke, [1921] 1 Ch. 34, 124 L. T. R. 229 (C. A. 1921). It has even been suggested
that "The opposite results of the cases [In re Phillips and In re Walls] may well be
caused by the presence of different policies in each; that behind the rule favoring cred-
itors, and that against tieing up property for too long a period." Dcvlopments it; the
Law-Futurc Interests-1932-1934 (1935) 48 Hv. L REv. 1202, 1240. Cf. 1 SuMs,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 432; Schuyler, Book Review (1942) 36 ILL. L Rmv. 801, 803.
If such a power is deemed general where creditors are concerned, it may be argued that
the Government should not be treated worse than creditors. Cf. Schuyler, supra note
40, at 780.
129. But see 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 436. See further Schuyler, Book Review
(1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 801, 803. Cf. Charlton v. Attorney General, 4 App. Cas. 427, 446
(1879), holding that a joint power is not a general power fur succession tax purposes.
Lord Selborne states that "general power" refers "to that kind of absolute power which
is practically equivalent to property, and which may reasonably be treated as property,
for the purpose of taxation. That is the case with a general power exercisable by a single
person in any way which he may think fit. But it is not the case when a power cannot
be exercised without the concurrence of two minds; the one donee having, and the other
not having, an interest to be displaced by its exercise ... 
130. Compare Schuyler, supra note 40, at 780.
131. 309 U. S. 78 (1940).
132. Compare Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940);
Harry J. Brown, 38 B. T. A. 293 (1938), aff'd sub norn. Skidmore v. Commissioner, 112
F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
133. See discussion sztpra at 299. Cf. Gump, supra note 99, at 311.
134. See Platt v. Routh, 6 M. & NV. 756 (Ex. 1840), aff'd, 3 Beav. 257 (Rolls Ct.
1841), aff'd sub noma. Drake v. Attorney General, 10 Cl. & F. 257 (H. L 1843), wherein
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result would follow if a testator used such a device as a power to appoint
within a class including all citizens of the United States. Similar reason-
ing would also justify a decision that a power to appoint to anyone except
the donee, his estate and his creditors be treated as general in characterlU3
The reasoning would not run counter to the definitions advanced in the
Morgan case, since the Court was not required to do more than refer to
the "usual" definition of a general power. 30 Such reasoning, moreover,
would be allied to the fundamental consideration that the classification
of a power should be determined by the purpose of the classification.,'
If the power may reasonably, for tax purposes, be considered the equiva-
lent of a power to appoint to anyone, it should be classified as general.'
The Property Must "Pass"
The loopholes and uncertainties considered thus far are essentially legis-
lative in origin. The courts, however, have faithfully cooperated in add-
ing their own quota of defects by concentrating upon a particular portion
Lord Abinger employs an analogous line of reasoning. However, he places emphasis upon
the donee's capacity to execute the power in payment of his debts.
135. Compare 3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 320, comment d, suggesting that
such powers are not special. The Restatement also suggests (§ 320, comment a) : "It may
be that they [hybrid powers] should be treated as general for some purposes and special
for others." This suggestion is broad enough to embrace classification for tax pur-
poses. But cf. 1 S mEs, op. cit. supra note 27, at 435: ". . . if the donee may appoint to
any person except himself or the executor or administrator of his own estate, it would
seem that the power might well be classed with special powers." In Porter v. Commis-
sioner, 288 U. S. 436, 441 (1933), a power in a settlor to modify a trust for any persons
other than the settlor and his estate was considered "the substantial equivalent" of a
general testamentary power.
136. See note 98 supro.
137. See Gold, supra note 81, at 363 ct seq. Cf. I SiMEs, op. cit. supra note 27, at 432,
which, while advocating this principle, limits it unduly with the broad statement that if
the power "is a mere option which the donee may exercise in favor of some one else, but
not in favor of himself, the power is special." See also Simes, Powers in Trust and the
Termination of Powers by the Donee, II (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 210, 212. Essentially the
same rationale outlined above would be employed with respect to private law issues, as,
for example, creditors' rights and perpetuitics. The courts would have to decide whether
the "hybrid" power should be subjected to the relevant rule governing general powers
or that governing special powers. The policy considerations underlying the rules should, it
seems, be determinative.
138. This rationale is not upset by the committee reports on the 1942 legislation,
which describe as general a power to appoint to the donee, his estate, his creditors, or
the creditors of his estate. See note 117 supra. The characterization is not all-inclusive.
The committees were desirous of providing appropriate exception for existing special
powers, and it seems that all powers other than those exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate, his creditors, or creditors of his estate were treated together because of the
difficulty of making any other workable distinction.
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of the statute.'39 Since property is taxable if "passing under a general
power" exercised by the decedent, the courts have concluded that a general
power may be exercised and yet nothing "pass." This result has been
achieved by combining the word "passing" with a spurious property con-
cept, thus adding an additional measure of unrealism to a provision already
sufficiently unrealistic.1 4 The foundation of the doctrinal structure was
provided by the Supreme Court in Helvering -,. Grinnell."' Speaking
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, the Court held that property subject to a
general power exercised by the decedent was not includible in his gross
estate where the property was appointed to persons who renounced their
interests under the appointment and received identical interests under the
donor's will as the takers in default. The Justice reasoned that the tax did
not fall upon a mere shifting of economic benefit but upon a shifting by
a particular method, i.e., a transmission of the property by the donee him-
self. There is no difference, it was observed, between a refusal to take
property and an election to take property under a distinct title.
Prior to the Grinell case it had generally been held that property passed
under the exercise of a power even if the donee appointed to the takers in
default the very interests they would have received in the absence of an
appointment. 4 ' This result was justified on the ground that the appoint-
ment confirmed a title which prior to the appointment had been defeasible.
In these cases no mention was made of any renunciation by the appoint-
ees,' 43 and it was therefore possible to draw a line between them and the
Grinnell situation. The Supreme Court, however, refused to draw the line,
for it considered the previous decisions in conflict with the conclusion
139. Compare Schuyler, su pra note 40, at 774.
140. For other discussions of "passing" see 1 PAUL, Pp. cit. sispra note 4, §§ 9.17-922;
Griswold, supra note 8, at 933.
141. 294 U. S. 153 (1935). Compare discussion supra at 304.
142. See Wear v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); Pennsyl-vania
Co. for Insurances on Lives v. Lederer, 292 Fed. 629 (E. D. Pa. 1921), (1924) 37 HAn'.
L. REV. 628; Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 287 (1934), rer'd. C. C. A.
6th, June 12, 1935; cf. Lee Y. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), ccri.
dcnied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932) (the taker in default received an interest of less value under
the appointment) ; John S. Montgomery, 17 B. T. A. 491 (1929). But cf. Estate of Helen
M. AV. Grant, 13 B. T. A. 174 (1928), which is "distinguished" in Edward J. Hancy,
17 B. T. A. 464 (1929). The early regulations had provided that propertyv was taxable
"although the persons to whom the appointment was made would have taken the prop-
erty had the power not been exercised." U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30 (1917 ed.) ; U. S.
Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 30 (1919 ed.); U. S. Treas. Reg. 37, ArtL 30 (1921 d.); U. S.
Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 25; U. S. Treas. Reg. 0S, Art. 24. This language -was dropped in
U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 24.
143. The Board, however, held similarly even where there was an election to take from
the donor. Edward J. Hancy, 17 B. T. A. 464 (1929). Cf. Cortlandt F. Bishop, 23 B.
T. A. 920 (1931).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
finally reached in the Grinnell case."' Hence it is a reasonable inference
that the renunciation was not the dominating factor in the decision. 145 The
Court rather seemed to fasten on the thought that the donor was the
source of the property since the donee had failed to affect its devolution.
The Grinnell opinion, upon close analysis, indicates that the Court
barely dipped into the questions involved. Undoubtedly the Court was
impressed with the fact that the remaindermen were in the very position
they would have occupied if the power had not been exercised. Professor
Griswold has observed that "it would indeed be an incongruous applica-
tion of the statute which would make the question of taxability turn solely
on whether the donee had in fact exercised the power, when the interests
which followed the donee's death were in no way affected by the fact that
it was exercised or not." 140 But, he indicates, the interpretation accorded
a statute is not necessarily erroneous simply because it entails incongruous
results. Statutory lines are not always sensible lines.' If the renuncia-
tion was the vital factor, it is necessarily true that the property "passed"
at the date of death. Why should events occurring at a later date affect
the taxability of the property? 148 On the other hand, if the renunciation
was irrelevant why is it not equally correct to say that the property passes
under the exercised power rather than the donor's will? '"'1
The Court had to rationalize its interpretation, and it did so by quoting
at some length from Matter of Lansing,"'° described by Mr. Justice Suth-
erland as a "well considered case." "I' This case dealt with a factual pat-
tern similar to that in Helvering v. Grinnell, but in connection with the
New York transfer tax,'5 2 a levy upon succession. The sole appointee, who
144. 294 U. S. at 158. In his brief the taxpayer suggested that the Wear and Le
decisions might be distinguished because they did not involve an election, and because,
as regards the Lee case, the appointment altered the scheme of distribution. See Brief
for Respondent, p. 12, Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935).
145. See Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760, 765 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940);
Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758, 761 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) ;
Griswold, supra note 8, at 935; Comment (1935) 48 HAiy. L. REV. 1202, 1249; (1941)
41 COL. L. REv. 149, 152; (1941) 54 HARv. L. Rav. 1406, 1407. Cf. Comment (1940) 39
MicH. L. REv. 302, 305, suggesting "a theory of presumed election" where the appointed
interests and the interests in default are identical. But compare the explanation in Da-
vison v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 16, 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Monks v. Driscoll, C. C.
H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 10,007 (W. D. Pa. 1943) ; and discussion infra at 334.
146. Griswold, supra note 8, at 935. Cf. Matter of Langdon, 153 N. Y. 6, 10, 46 N, E."
1034, 1035 (1897).
147. Compare Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 347 (1940).
148. Compare (1905) 19 I-ARv. L. REV. 139, 140. But cf. (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv.
1406, 1407. See p. 306 supra.
149. See note 142 supra.
150. 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), 19 HARv. L. REV. 139.
151. 294 U. S. at 156.
152. N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 284, §220(5).
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was. also sole taker in default, opposed the tax assessment on the ground
that she elected to receive the property under the donor's will. The stat-
ute imposing the levy had been enacted after the death of the donor but
prior to that of the donee, and taxed property subject to a power as if the
donee were owner thereof, whether or not the power was exercised. A
majority of the New York Court of Appeals held that the property was
constitutionally immune from tax because the transfer of tile remainder
was effected under the donor's will prior to the effective date of the tax-
ing statute.
The prevailing opinion in the Lansing case moves in several directions
and is hardly enlightening where Mr. Justice Sutherland is obscure. At
first the opinion is devoted to the proposition that there was no transfer
since the purported exercise of the power neither increased nor dimin-
ished the share of the taker in default. The so-called exercise was a mere
form "because it did nothing." "I Then the opinion shifts to the theory
that there was no transfer from the donee because an effective exercise is
dependent upon the appointee's consent to receive the property from the
donee and the appointee had consistently rejected title under the donee's
will. Thereafter the opinion briefly dismisses that portion of the statute
imposing tax where the power is not exercised as obviously invalid if
applied to the devolution involved. Finally, it is observed that the result
is the same whether the remainder in default of appointment was vested
or contingent prior to the donee's death.' The dissenting opinion, 1 "
which is surprisingly "modern" in tone, asserts that the taker in default
had a contingent remainder and that the right of succession finally accrued
at the donee's death. Furthermore, the exercise is deemed effectual be-
cause it created a new estate, although the extent thereof was identical
with that of the estate in default. It is argued, in addition, that there was
no binding election because the appointee had merely opposed the tax as-
sessment. In this connection it is asserted that the appointee had to rely
153. The Court of Appeals uses the following expressions in referring to the exer-
cise: the power "as formally exercised;" "the attempt to exercise the power;" "the
power was exercised in form;" the exercise was "a mere form;" the exercise was "a
mere formality." The same court in Matter of Slosson, 216 N. Y. 79, 110 N. E. 1C6
(1915), seems to hold that the donee's designation of takers in default is not an exer-
cise even if their interests are less under the designation. In Estate of Rees, 233 Wis.
635, 644, 290 N. NV. 167, 170 (1940), the court speaks of a "professed" exercise. Cf. Arn-
old v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 197, 123 S. NA. 1162, 1167 (190)9),
where the alleged exercise is characterized as "a futile act--one which ctuld confer no
benefit whatever."
154. Compare Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 19, 116 N. E. 348, 349 (1917). As
Mr. Paul has observed, "It is a poor argument that cannot be used by both sides:' PAUL,
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, THIRD SERIES (1940) 299. Cumpare In re Murphy's
Estate, 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46 (1920), where the Lansing case is cited in support uf
taxability.
155. 182 N. Y. at 249, 74 N. E. at 886.
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upon the donee's will because the interest in default was subject to an
exercise of the power.
Although the donee's demise could not constitutionally effect a "trans-
fer" in the Lansing case, Mr. Justice Sutherland indicated in Helvering v.
Grinnell, with the brevity born of the obvious, that the donee's death
marked a transmission from the dead to the living which a legislature
could treat as a taxable event. The only question was whether the legis-
lature had done so. 5 ' Obviously, if the Lansing decision is "well con-
sidered," its merit inheres in its constitutional exegesis. But no one im-
mersed in the mysteries of federal tax law would seriously claim that the
case deserves recognition on this score. Congress may tax tinexercised gen-
eral powers,1 57 and a fortiori it may tax such powers when exercised re-
gardless of the fact that the persons appointed are the takers in default.
Nor does merit emerge if the reasoning of the Lansing decision is con-
fined to cases where the creation of the power precedes the enactment of
the taxing statute.-" For one must still explain why a "transfer" concept,
fashioned to avoid the retroactive application of a state tax measure, is
relevant in ascertaining the scope of a federal statute ;1'59 especially when
the borrowed doctrine would be rejected as "bad law" by the Supreme
Court if advanced on a constitutional level. There must be some limit to
what an imaginative court may attribute to a legislature.
The reasoning in the Grinnell case does not gain in cogency if we over-
look its borrowing of poor constitutional law. It is still a reflection of the
156. 294 U. S. at 156. Cf. Griswold, supra note 8, at 934, n. 25.
157. Compare Whitney v. State Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530 (1940) ; United States
v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296
U. S. 85 (1935) ; Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933) ; Tyler v. United States,
281 U. S. 497 (1930) ; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929) ; Chase
National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929) ; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276
U. S. 260 (1928). Although these cases, with one exception, did not involve powers of
appointment bestowed upon the decedent by another, their significance with respect to
such powers is unmistakable, regardless of exercise and the appointees thereunder.
But the New York Court of Appeals seems to be still hypnotized by the thought that
a tax on an unexercised power "is without any foundation either in fact or in theory,"
since the donee transfers nothing. Matter of Vanderbilt, 281 N. Y. 297, 310, 22 N. E,
(2d) 379, 387 (1939). See, further, Matter of Duff, 114 Misc. 309, 186 N. Y. Supp. 259
(Surr. Ct. 1921), aft'd, 196 App. Div. 969, 188 N. Y. Supp. 918 (1st Dep't 1921). The
Supreme Court, in affirming the decision in the Vanderbilt case, has indicated that its
concepts of a taxable transfer are not similarly circumscribed. See Whitney v. State Tax
Commission, 309 U. S. 530, 538-39 (1940). Cf. Matter of Bartow, 30 Misc. 27, 62 N. Y.
Supp. 1000 (Surr. Ct. 1899).
158. Compare Matter of Hoffman, 161 App. Div. 836, 839-840, 146 N. Y. Supp. 898,
901 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd. 212 N. Y. 604. 106 N. E. 1034 (1914) ; Matter of Backhouse,
110 App. Div. 737, 738, 96 N. Y. Supp. 466, 467 (2d Dep't 1906), aff'd, 185 N. Y. 544,
77 N. E. 1181 (1906), where some importance seems to be placed on the fact that the
remainders in default had vested before the taxing statute was enacted.
159. Compare I PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 114.
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Lansing case, albeit a distorted one.160 The Lansing doctrine is essen-
tially two-pronged: an appointment which leaves the remainderman's
interest intact is not an "exercise" which constitutes a transfer from the
donee; and a power is not effectively exercised if the appointee elects to
receive the property under the donor's will.' Mr. Justice Sutherland
quoted excerpts from the Lansing case which justified each of these propo-
sitions, thus similarly failing to focus upon a single rationale and ne-
glecting to note a basic inconsistency in the Lansing case.'62 For there is
nothing to renounce, in a proprietary sense, if the donee transfers noth-
ing.' 63 Nor does the Grinnell case indicate that the Justice was aware of
the fact that an "election" under the Lansing case had come to mean
merely a refusal to pay tax where the donee "formally" exercises his
160. In the Lansing case the court managed to get its concept of "transfer" into the
statute via the word "exercise." It was held that there was no real exercise because
nothing really passed under the power. In the Grinnell case, however, it vas flatly held,
without any discussion, that the power was exercised but that nothing "passed:' The
taxpayer conceded that the power was "exercised" See Brief for Respondent, p. 4,
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935). At another point, Brief for Respondent,
supra at 8, it is indicated that "passing" requires an "effectual exercise." If an exercise
is a transfer of an interest in property (see discussion suipra at 304), then it would
seem that something must have passed from the donee.
161. It has been thought (Griswold, supra note 8, at 934) that the Supreme Court, in
quoting liberally from the Lansing case, approached the question of statutory interpreta-
tion "from the old-line property point of view"--"the dogma of the common law,' that the
appointee takes from the donor of the power not from the donee, even though the power
is general." LEAcH, loc. cit. supra note 31. However, it seems more correct to observe
that the Court borrowed a spurious property doctrine from the Lansing case, which had
been fashioned for another purpose. The faithful absorption of legal doctrine is often
conspicuous for a peculiar lack of discrimination.
162. The following New York decisions ha;'e applied the Lansing doctrine where there
was an identity of interests without invoking the principle of election: Matter of Haight,
152 App. Div. 228, 136 N. Y. Supp. 557 (2d Dep't 1912) (reserved power); Matter of
Spencer, 119 App. Div. 883, 107 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1st Dep't 1907), appeal dismissed, 190
N. Y. 517, 83 N. E. 1132 (1907); Matter of Backhouse, 110 App. Div. 737, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 466 (2d Dep't 1906), aff'd, 185 N. Y. 544, 77 N. E. 1181 (1906); Mfatter of Mor-
gan, 164 App. Div. 854, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1022 (1st Dep't 1914) (one of the powers was
reserved) ; 'atter of Schell, 134 Misc. 242, 234 N. Y. Supp. 305 (Surr. Ct. 1926) (re-
served power). In the Matter of Chapman, 133 App. Div. 337, 117 N. Y. Supp. 679 (2d
Dep't 1909), appeal dismissed. 196 N. Y. 561, 90 N. E. 1157 (1909), it is observed that
the taker's position with respect to tax liability is a sufficient election if any is necessary.
Other decisions have relied upon the disclaimer aspect of the Lansing case as well: Mat-
ter of Hoffman, 161 App. Div. 836, 146 N. Y. Supp. S98 (1st Dept 1914), aff'd, 212 N.
Y. 604, 106 N. E. 1034 (1914) ; Matter of Haggerty, 128 App. Div. 479, 112 N. Y. Supp.
1017 (1st Dep't 1908), aff'd, 194 N. Y. 550, 87 N. E. 1120 (1909) ; cf. Matter of Mforrison,
122 Misc. 162, 203 N. Y. Supp. 367 (Surr. Ct. 1923). It seems to he "a common prac-
tice" for appointees formally to elect to take the property from the donor. See 3 REsTAT?-
MEXT, PROPERTY (1940) § 369, comment c.
163. See Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758, 761 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1940) ; Estate of Rees, 233 Wis. 635, 644, 290 N. W. 167, 171 (1940).
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power.' Finally, and most significantly, the Lansing case does not rep-
resent property doctrine. In a number of instances it has been decided
that an appointment in favor of the taker in default creates a new interest
in him, and is not simply an ineffective reaffirmation of the donor's will.'
The best evidence that the Lansing case does not mirror established prop-
erty law seems to be provided by the Restatement,' 0 which declares that
creditors cannot avail themselves of appointive assets if the property is
appointed to the taker in default.' This principle is derived primarily
from the Lansing and Grinnell cases, although creditors have repeatedly
been allowed to reach assets regardless of whether the appointee is also
a taker in default. 16'
The essential frailty of the Lansing rationale is revealed from another
vantage point; for the same court which decided the Lansing case simul-
taneously passed upon Matter of Cooksey,' where victory went the
other way. In the latter case the donee had a power to appoint among her
children and the issue of deceased children. The remainder, in the event
164. See Matter of Chapman, 133 App. Div. 337, 117 N. Y. Supp. 679 (2d Dep't 1909),
appeal dismissed, 196 N. Y. 561, 90 N. E. 1157 (1909); cf. Matter of King, 217 N. Y.
358, 111 N. E. 1060 (1916); Matter of Hoffman, 161 App. Div. 836, 146 N. Y. Supp.
898 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 604, 106 N. E. 1034 (1914). In Matter of Back-
house, 110 App. Div. 737, 96 N. Y. Supp. 466 (2d Dep't 1906), aff'd, 185 N. Y. 544, 77
N. E. 1181 (1906), the court states that there is no evidence whether the takers could
elect to take under the appointment, "if it can be called such." Obviously, if resistance to
tax is an election, "the requirement of election is illusory, since it will always exist when-
ever an issue is raised which could depend upon it." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1938) 154.
165. See discussion in FARwELL, op. cit. supra note 88, at 275 et seq.; 1 PAUL, op.
cit. supra note 4, §§ 9.18, 9.19. But compare Schuyler, supra note 40, at 774-75: "The Con-
gress chose to use a word of art, a property lawyer's word, importing considerations of
legal title, and it can but expect a property lawyer's interpretation."
166. The Lansing and Grinnell cases are approved in 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940)
§ 369.
167. Id. § 327, comment a, illustration 4; § 369, comment b. The Restatement, § 369,
comment a, is of the opinion that "to whatever extent a donee purports to appoint to a
person an interest already held in default of appointment he does not exercise his power
to alter the donor's disposition but merely declares his intention not to alter it."
168. Compare (1938) 15 PRoc. A. L. I. 296 and RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (Proposed
Final Draft No. 2, 1938) 151, with RESTATEMENT, supra at 155 (Memorandum in sup-
port of dissent by Messrs. Powell and Simes). But see Arnold v. Southern Pine Lum-
ber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 197, 123 S. W. 1162, 1167 (1909). The court's position
that the takers in default received identical interests under the appointment is contrary
to the legal effect of the instruments involved. The takers in default seem to have re-
ceived less under the appointment than they would otherwise have received. Boyce v.
Waller, 9 Dana 478, 483-84 (Ky. 1840), which supports the Restatement position, has
in effect, been rendered irrelevant by St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802,
83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935).
169. 182 N. Y. 92, 74 N. E. 880 (1905). The opinion was written by Judge Haight,
who wrote the dissenting opinion in the Lansing case.
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of a failure to appoint, was given to the same group, with discretion in
the trustees to make payments from the appointive property to the re-
spective takers, in certain proportions not exceeding stated amounts with
respect to specified ages, until each should attain a designated age and
thereupon be entitled to an allocable portion of the property. The donee
in exercising her power substantially adopted the disposition in default
of appointment with two exceptions: the payments of the trust fund to
be made at the specified ages were set at the maximum amiounts desig-
nated by the donor, thus depriving tile trustees of their discretion; and
the trustees under the donee's will, in lieu of tile guardian, were given
authority to determine amounts necessary for the maintenance of the
beneficiaries during minority. In sustaining tile tax assessment, the Court
of Appeals reasoned that the remainder in default could vest only if the
donee died intestate and that if the donee did exercise the power, the
appointees were required to take under the appointment. Furthermore,
the court explained, the exercised power effected material changes in the
disposition of the remainder, and hence the exercise could not he treated
as a nullity.""
The significant distinguishing factor between this opinion and the
Lansing case seems to be whether the appointment effects a change in
interest.' But in the Cooksey case the court advanced as a separate rea-
170. Compare Matter of Dows, 167 N. Y. 227, 60 N. E. 439 (1901), aff'd sub noin.
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1902) and Matter of Delano, 176 N. Y. 486. 63 IN. E.
871 (1903), aff'd sub nom. Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466 (1907). In the Dtrws case
the donee could appoint among his children and issue of deceased children, who were
also the takers in default. He exercised his power in favor of his three sons, so that each
received the income from one-third of the property and one-third of the corpus attribut-
able to a brother's income share when such brother died. As a result each son acquired
one-third of the property absolutely. In including the property in the donee's estate, the
court remarked that "whatever be the technical source of title of a grantee under a power
of appointment, it cannot be denied that in reality and substance it is the execution of the
power that gives to the grantee the property passing under it." In the Delano case the
donee could appoint within a class consisting of her brothers, her sister and their issue.
She appointed the property to her nephew, who would have received less under the
donor's will as taker in default. In sustaining the tax, the court held that the nephew's
title to most of the property depended on the donee's will as well as upon the donor's
creation of the power. Compare note 47 supra. See, in addition, Matter of Vanderbilt,
50 App. Div. 246, 63 N. Y. Supp. 1079 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 163 N. Y. 597, 57 N. E.
1127 (1900), wherein the donee could appoint among her issue, who were also the takers
in default. The donee appointed a specified portion to one son and divided the balance
of the property among the others. The court drew a distinction between the technical
source of the appointees' title and the specified shares received as of the date the power
was executed. Note that the shares appointed were either smaller or greater than the
interests in default of appointment.
171. Compare Matter of Warren, 62 Misc. 444, 448, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1034, 1037 (Surr.
Ct. 1909), holding that the appointees may elect to take from the donor only if the exer-
cise is "a mere formality confirming the title previously acquired."
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son for its conclusion the theory that the remainder in default did not
vest unless the donee failed to exercise the power. 17' And here "exercise"
was apparently not being employed in the Lansing sense. Otherwise the
court in the Cooksey case would not refer to the "material changes" made
by the donee as an additional basis for its decision. Thus in short, the
court inferentially repudiated its own "transfer" concept in an effort to
reconcile the results of both cases.
While the Grinnell case may be weak in reasons, it may still be sturdy
in result. A donee who appoints to takers in default shares identical with
those they would receive in the, absence of appointment may well be re-
garded as entitled to the treatment accorded a donee who remains silent.
The conclusion is at least sufficiently reasonable to avoid charges of undue
judicial tampering with legislation. Unfortunately, however, there has
been a tendency to expand the Grinnell rule to include situations which
do not call for similar judicial intervention. This tendency focuses, in
turn, upon Mr. Justice Sutherland's failure to indicate whether the iden-
tity of interests or the election constituted the core of his opinion. 17  Situa-
172. Compare Estate of Rees, 233 Wis. 635, 643, 290 N. W. 167, 170 (1940), which
states that the Lansing decision involved a remainder subject only to a power of change
in the donee. In Matter of Ripley, 122 App. Div. 419, 106 N. Y. Supp. 844 (2d Dep't
1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 536, 84 N. E. 574 (1908), the court indicates that there is a tax
difference between a gift to remaindermen if the donee fails to exercise his power, and
a gift to remaindermen unless the property is otherwise disposed of by the donee. Com-
pare Edward J. Hancy, 17 B. T. A. 464 (1929), with Estate of Helen M. W. Grant,
13 B. T. A. 174 (1928).
On various occasions it has been emphasized, in distinguishing the Cooksey case, that
the remainder in default depended upon a failure to exercise the power, and since the
donee exercised the power the appointees had to take under the power. See Matter of
Lowndes, 60 Misc. 506, 507, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (Surr. Ct. 1908); Matter of Hag-
gerty, 128 App. Div. 479, 483, 112 N. Y. Supp. 1017, 1020 (1st Dep't 1908), aft'd, 194
N. Y. 550, 87 N. E. 1120 (1909) ; Matter of Spencer, 119 App. Div. 883, 884, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 543, 544 (1st Dep't 1907), appeal dismissed, 190 N. Y. 517, 83 N. E. 1132 (1907).
In Matter of Lewis, 60 Misc. 643, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1112 (Surr. Ct. 1908), reed, 129
App. Div. 905, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1136 (1st Dep't 1908) and Matter of Lowndes, 60
Misc. 506, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (Surr. Ct. 1908), tax was sustained on the basis of this
theory of the Cooksey case. Cf. Woodward, J., dissenting in Matter of Chapman, 133
App. Div. 337, 340, 117 N. Y. Supp. 679, 682 (2d Dep't 1909), appeal dismissed, 196 N. Y.
561, 90 N. E. 1157 (1909); Houghton, J., dissenting in Matter of Haggerty, 128 App,
Div. 479, 484, 112 N. Y. Supp. 1017, 1020 (lst Dep't 1908), aff'd, 194 N. Y. 550, 87 N. E.
1120 (1909). Under the reasoning of Matter of Hoffman, 161 App. Div. 836, 146 N. Y.
Supp. 898 (lst Dep't 1914), aft'd, 212 N. Y. 604, 106 N. E. 1034 (1914), this explana-
tion of the Cooksey case becomes irrelevant. See, further, Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H.
1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 10,007 (W. D. Pa. 1943), based partly on the thought that the
appointees had to take under the donee's will, if at all.
173. Compare Estate of Carrie L. Jones, 41 B. T. A. 1279 (1940), where the ap-
pointee elected to take under the donor's will but the Board sustained the taxpayer's posi-
tion on the ground that the exercise itself was a mere form because it left "everything
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tions where the appointed interest differs from the interest in default indi-
cate the subtle rationalism induced by the Grinnell case.
The appointed interest is less than the interest in default. If the taker
in default receives a lesser interest by appointment than he would have by
disposition in default, several cases have held that there is no tax upon the
lesser share. 4 Thus, where the donee's four children were entitled as
takers in default to equal shares in the corpus of a trust fund, and each
received by appointment a life interest in one-fifth of the corpus, the value
of the four life interests was deemed exempt from tax.' These decisions
are apparently rooted in the thought that under local law the greater
estate is received from the donor and that the power, when exercised,
merely divests the taker in default of a part of such estate.'- The latter's
failure to renounce his appointed interest and elect to take from the donor




The doctrine of these cases appears to be quite attractive if the differ-
ence between the respective shares is merely quantitative. For example,
if the gift in default is $100,000 and the appointed share is $60,000, the
property does not "pass" to the extent of the $60,000, since the status of
this amount has not been disturbed. The cases, however, go further, for
similar theorizing is indulged where the difference between the two inter-
as it was before." In Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, 32 B. T. A. 203 (1935), the
renunciation was emphasized.
174. Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4l, 1940) ; Rothensics
v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940); Lewis v.
Rothensies, 46 F. Supp. 705 (E. D. Pa. 1942); Estate of Gertrude Buclmell Day, 44 B.
T. A. 524 (1941); Lewis Spencer Morris, 39 B. T. A. 570 (1939); James C. Webster,
38 B. T. A. 273 (1938) ; Estate of Mildred S. A. Platt, C. C. H. 1942 Fed. Tax Serv.
112,903-N (BTA mem.) ; Estate of Henry H. Rogers, C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Ser'.
f1 12,230-A (BTA mem.). But cf. Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Ser.
110,007 (IV. D. Pa. 1943). See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 118 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). In the Legg case, supra at 765, the court
states that if it were not for the Grihnell decision it would be inclined to hold that extin-
guishment of a possibility of defeasance was a sufficient "passing." In Estate of Mary
Adele Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408 (1938), it was held that the appointee had elected to take
under the power. The same theory reappears in Estate of Cassius E. Wakefield, 44 B.
T. A. 677 (1941). But see 3 RE.STATEENm.m, PROPERTY (1940) § 369, comment c.
175. Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940).
176. It makes no difference whether the gift in default is vested or contingent. Lewis
Spencer Morris, 39 B. T. A. 570 (1939). But cf. Estate of Mary Adele Morris, 38 B.
T. A. 408, 418 (1938), pointing to a distinction between vested remainders in default of
appointment and remainders contingent upon failure to appoint, while conceding that
"this may be a narrow distinction and one in all probability not always easy to apply."
177. But cf. Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 1 10,007 (IV. D. Pa.
1943).
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ests is also qualitative; 178 and in these situations the divestment theory
fully reveals its over-refinements. Thus, the interest in default may be an
absolute remainder and the appointed interest a life estate,' 70 or the inter-
est in default may be an indefeasibly vested remainder whereas the appoint-
ed interest is a contingent remainder. While the quality of the respective
interests may be similar, the contingencies upon which enjoyment depends
may vary.' Again, a qualitative difference may be combined with a
change in contingency determining enjoyment, as where a taker entitled
to an outright fee in default of exercise receives via exercise an income
interest until majority, when the fee ripens in possession.1
8 1
178. See 3 RESTATEmENT, PRoPERT" (1940) § 369, wherein tax immunity for the
lesser appointed interest is advocated if the difference is merely quantitative, but no posi-
tion is taken where the variation by appointment is qualitatively different. Compare
Powell, supra note 10, at 249, apparently approving the Restatement view where the ap-
pointed interest is less in quantum, but suggesting that the federal decisions involving
qualitative differences may have gone too far.
179. In Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), the
appointed interest was a life estate in two-thirds of the property, plus a successor life
estate in the other third, while the interest in default was the entire corpus; in Rothen-
sies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940), the ap-
pointed interest was a life estate in one-fifth of the corpus and the interest in default was
one-fourth of the corpus; in Estate of Gertrude Bucknell Day, 44 B. T. A. 524 (1941),
the appointed interest was a life estate to be augmented upon tile death of the taker's
father and the interest in default was the entire corpus; in Lewis Spencer Morris, 31)
B. T. A. 570 (1939), two of the appointed interests were life estates whereas the inter-
ests in default were portions of the corpus; in Estate of Mildred S. A. Platt, C. C. H.
1942 Fed. Tax Serv. f 12,903-N (BTA mem.) the appointed interest was a life estate
while the gift in default was a fee; in Estate of Henry H. Rogers, C. C. H. 1941 Fed.
Tax Serv. 12,230-A (BTA mem.) the interest appointed to each of two takers in default
consisted of 6.667 percent of one-third of the property given outright and a life estate in
the balance of the one-third, with a reduction in trust corpus in the case of one of the life
tenants in the event of remarriage and a contingent remainder in such corpus for the
benefit of the other life tenant, whereas the interest in default consisted of one-third of the
corpus for each of the two takers. In Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax
Serv. g 10,007 (W. D. Pa. 1943), the entire value of property received by default takers
under the donee's disposition was taxed under the following circumstances: the appointed
interest of each taker in default consisted of a right for a ten year period to the income
yielded by slightly over one-sixth of the corpus, and outright ownership of such share of
the corpus thereafter, with a power in the taker to dispose of the corpus in the event of
death during the ten-year period; the gift in default of appointment was fee ownership
of one-fourth of the corpus.
180. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rothensies, 46 F. Supp. 706 (E. D. Pa. 1942). Cf. Lee v.
Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 563 (1932),
where the remainder in default was immediately effective upon the termination of a life
estate, and the remainder under the appointment was preceded by an additional life
estate.
181. Compare Matter of Lichtenstein, 177 Misc. 320, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 455 (Surr.
Ct. 1941).
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The metaphysical refinements of the divestment theory are revealed by
another consideration. Assume that A and B are each entitled to one-half
the property in default of appointment, and that the donee appoints the
entire income from the property to A for life, with remainder to B. Al-
though the value of A's life estate should be less than the value of one-
half the fee, it would not follow that the entire life estate is not taxable.
Nor would B's entire appointed share be free from tax if the present
value of B's remainder under the appointment should be less than the
value of one-half of the fee allotted to him in the absence of appointment.
Under the divestment theory the appointive property does not pass under
the power "if the share of a particular appointee would have passed to
him irrespective of the exercise of the power." 182 Certainly this rationale
is inapplicable, in the examples given, to one-half the value of A's life
estate and one-half the value of B's remainder under the appointment. Yet
under the divestment theory the other halves would be regarded as not
passing, although the entire scheme of distribution derives from the
donee's disposition of the property. Here are "gossamer distinctions" in
dire need of another Hallock case."
There is still another factor to be considered: the difficult valuation
problems generated by the extension of the Grinnell principle to the fac-
tual patterns under discussion. 84 The decision in Central Hanover Bank
& Trzst Co. v. Conmissioner ... provides an outstanding example. The
donor had bequeathed her property to the decedent in trust for the benefit
of her four sons as income recipients, and at the death of each son his re-
spective share of corpus was to pass to the decedent or, if he predeceased
the particular son, to the appointees of the decedent. All four sons sur-
vived the decedent, and at the latter's death were aged respectively, 54, 51,
49, 48, the eldest son dying soon after. At that time the 49 year old son
had two infant children, and no additional issue were born to the sons
subsequent to the decedent's demise. The decedent appointed each share of
principal to the children of the particular income beneficiary or, in the
event that a son died without leaving issue surviving, to his brothers
and/or the issue of a deceased brother, with a contingent remainder to
charity. The sons renounced their interests under the appointment, elect-
ing to share in the donor's estate under the rules of intestacy, and claimed
182. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 270, 273 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941).
183. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 118 (1940).
184. Problems, of course, should not be avoided simply because they are difficult. Yet
one of the primary merits of the estate tax is its relative freedom from the valuation
difficulties deriving from an inheritance tax. See Comment (1938) 47 Y=uu L. J. 1354.
And this aspect of the estate tax should be kept to the forefront as a significant factor
in the choice of governing principle.
185. 118 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), 54 HAv. L. IEv. 140b.
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that the value of such interests received by inheritance from the donor was
immune from tax.186
The Board 187 determined that all the appointive property was includible
in the decedent's gross estate regardless of the renunciation. While the
reasoning was not too clear, the following considerations were apparently
dominant: in order to obtain tax immunity it had to be shown that "the
entire remainder was appointed to the sons and that they each had the
same title by inheritance as was appointed to them" ;""8 even if immunity
was justified because the sons renounced the appointments to them or the
property failed to pass, it was impossible to determine the respective por-
tion each son would take in view of the possible contingencies; other
appointees would receive the property if certain contingencies occurred;
and the remainder interests appointed to the sons were "vastly different
in character and scope" from the intestate interests and depended upon
the provisions of the appointment. Failing to find these considerations
persuasive, the Second Circuit held that the value of the appointive prop-
erty was exempt to the extent that it passed from the donor, regardless
of the fact that the appointment specified the contingencies upon which
the receipt of the intestate shares depended.'" Hence the issue boiled
down to a problem of valuation. The court indicated, for example, that if
all the sons were to die in the order of their respective ages, leaving only
the two offspring surviving, one half of the corpus would pass in intes-
tacy from the donor and the other half under the appointment. In view of
the ages of the sons and issue, said the court, it might not be unreasonable
to treat only the remainder interests in the trusts for the two youngest
sons as property passing from the donee. It is obvious, however, that the
sequence of respective deaths is subject to a number of variations. It is
equally apparent that the determination of present values of interests
which will probably vest as a result of a succession of deaths is a neat
problem in actuarial computation. The court, however, was not unduly
troubled, but it simply remanded the case to the Board to determine the
value of the interests passing after weighing the possible contingencies in
the light of actuarial and other expert testimony. However complicated this
case may be, it hardly probes the depths of complexity inherent in the
current interpretation of the Grinell case.'
The valuation problems raised by the divestment theory are similarly
complex in determining the relative worth of alternative interests. For
186. Although this case involved a renunciation, the valuation difficulty deriving froni
variable contingencies is equally relevant to the divestment theory.
187. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 40 B. T. A. 1210 (1939).
188. 40 B. T. A. at 1218.
189. See (1941) 54 Haav. L. REv. 1406, 1407.
190. The Board apparently is saddled with all the practical difficulties occasioned by
bad law. Cf. discussion at p. 309 supra.
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example, as taker in default one may be entitled to the remainder in fee,
but as appointee one may actually receive a life estate. It is therefore argu-
able that the life estate is a lesser interest than the remainder in default
since a fee includes all the lesser interests which may be carved out of
it.' Suppose, however, a person who is entitled, in default of appoint-
ment, to an equitable life estate in a spendthrift trust receives a legal estate
for life from the donee. Does the appointment bestow a greater or lesser
estate? The legal estate allows him greater freedom with his income, but
the equitable estate affords him greater protection from the claims of cred-
itors. Or, assume that the donee appoints to a taker in default a life
estate plus a power of appointment, whereas in the absence of appointment
he is entitled to the remainder in fee. How is one to measure the com-
parative values of the two interests? 192 Assume, again, that certain re-
maindermen who are each entitled to one-fourth of the property in default
of appointment receive under the power a one-third share subject to a
life interest in a fourth person. The gifts to the remaindermen by appoint-
ment certainly bestow a greater fee interest, but the possibility of enjoy-
ing such interest may be rather remote due to the intervening life estate.
Is the greater interest determined by the comparative possibilities of
enjoyment during life, or is the determinative factor the greater fee inter-
est which the remainderman may bequeath upon his death, or, finally,
are the values of the alternative gifts to be ascertained by some combina-
tion of both and other factors? 103
A good deal of this confusion would be obviated by recognizing
that the divestment theory is not a necessary corollary of the Grhi-
nell case.194 In contrast to the Grimnell situation, the divestment case is
not one of two minds running in the same channel. The donee has actively
fashioned a new disposition in accordance with his understanding of rela-
tive needs, and the appointment is no longer analogous to a non-exercise
which assures tax immunity.-' It is necessary to resort to the donee's
191. See Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.. 112 F. (2d) 753, 763 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1940).
192. In Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. U 10,007 (IV. D. Pa.
1943), involving a similar fact pattern, there wvas no need to consider the problem because
the appointed property was included in its entirety.
193. Compare Matter of Warren, 62 Misc. 444, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (Surr. Ct. 1909).
194. This is true even if a renunciation of the appointed interest is not considered a
factor vital to the Gi;inell decision. But see discussion at p. 334 infra.
195. Compare Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Tax Serv. 110,007 (W. D. Pa.
1943) ; Matter of Warren, 62 Misc. 444, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1034 (Surr. Ct. 1909). But see
the statement in the Grinnell case, 294 U. S. at 15S, that the "reasoning and conclu-
sions" of Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. do,icd, 226 U. S.
563 (1932), cannot be reconciled with the views of the Second Circuit approved in the
Grimell case. The facts in the Lee case reveal that the taker in default received the re-
mainder in either case, but that under the appointment the remainder vas preceded by a
life estate.
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will in order to determine the taker's title and interest. 10 The divestment
theory is predicated upon the assumption that a portion of the appointive
property passes from the donor while another portion passes from the
donee.' The artificial character of this reasoning is emphasized where
there are differences other than quantitative between the appointed estate
and the estate in default. But only a faithful disciple of Coke '1 would
detect the donor's hand in the ultimate devolution if the taker receives a
life interest in lieu of a fee, or an income interest until the age of 21 to
be succeeded by outright fee ownership instead of immediate ownership
of the fee. Furthermore, where an appointment is in trust for those who
would take in default of appointment, the legal title passes to a stranger
having no interest under the donor's will.' 0 In the Lansing case the court
underlined the fact that the exercise did not effectively transfer the prop-
erty because "nothing was added to or taken away from the gift" by the
donee's will.2"0 In other words, an exercise effects a transfer from the
donee when it does something different, and the difference may be pro-
duced by reducing the benefits flowing to the taker in default. The signifi-
cant element, as the Cooksey opinion indicates, is change in the scheme
of distribution,0 1 which apparently would also include the appointment of
another person to administer income payments. Finally there is the very
practical consideration, disregarded by the divestment theory, that the
exercise of a power commonly reshuffles the interests of takers in de-
fault. It is nevertheless assumed that the statute was intended to be
largely ineffective where a typical exercise occurs.
The logic of the divestment theory is not appreciably assisted by invok-
ing local law. In considering the identity of interests, aside from election,
the Supreme Court in the Grinnell case did not look to the Lansing
decision in order to determine whether local law regarded the property
as "passing" under the power.2"2 Its conclusions would have been the
196. Compare Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 247, 74 N. E. 882, 885 (1905);
(1909) 9 COL. L. REv. 275, 276.
197. Compare Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.. 40 B. T. A. 1210, 1218 (1939),
rev'd, 118 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). The New York Court of Appeals seems to
think that the power is only partly exercised. Matter of Slosson, 216 N. Y. 79, 110 N.
E. 166 (1915).
198. Compare 2 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1178.
199. See (1941) 41 CoL L. Rxv. 149, 154.
200. See 182 N. Y. at 243, 74 N. E. at 883. Cf. Matter of Haight, 152 App. Div. 228,
230, 136 N. Y. Supp. 557, 559 (2d Dep't 1912) ; Matter of Chapman, 133 App. Div. 337,
339, 117 N. Y. Supp. 679, 681 (2d Dep't 1909), appeal dismissed, 196 N. Y. 561, 90 N. E.
1157 (1909) ; Matter of Spencer, 119 App. Div. 883, 884, 107 N. Y. Supp. 543, 544 (1st
Dep't 1907), appeal dismissed, 190 N. Y. 517, 83 N. E. 1132 (1907).
201. Compare the changes made by the donee in Lewis v. Rothensies, 46 F. Supp. 706
(E. D. Pa. 1942).
202. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 9.15, 9.20.
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same in a state such as Rhode Island, where the rationale .. f the Laising
case has been disapproved,0 3 if the remainder interests and the appointed
interests were identical. Hence there is no compulsion to apply the di-
vestment theory even if the courts of a particular jurisdiction subscribe
to it.2°4 This is especially true with respect to New York. where the thei iry
represents tax law rather than property law.20 ' Since the only reastnahle
justification for the Grinnell decision is the economic equivalence of a non-
exercise and the appointment of identical shares to the takers in default,
such equivalence should not be affected by local whimsies concerning
203. See Manning v. Board of Tax Commissioners, 46 R. I. 400, 1-27 Atl. 965 (1925):
cf. Commonwealth v. Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S. W. (2d) 3
(1940).
204. But cf. the line of reasoning in Grinnell v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 705 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1934), aff'd, 294 U. S. 153 (1935) ; and Estate of Zachary Smith Reynllds, 42
B. T. A. 145, 157 (1940), aff'd sub nora. Helvering v. Safe Depoisit and Trust Co. of
Baltimore, 121 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), re-"d on other grounds, 316 U. S. 56
(1942). Obviously, state law determines the substance of one's proprietary rights. But
the Grinnell decision is based on the identity of the appointed interest and the interest
in default, and it is immaterial whether the interest received is attributed by local law
to the donor or the donee.
If creditors of the donee are enabled to reach a portion of the assets passing to the
taker in default, there is no longer an identity of interests and it seems entirely proper
to hold that an effective change in disposition, through the agency of the donee, has ren-
dered the Grinnell case inapplicable. But here again a federal standard is applied once
the substantive effect of the appointment is ascertained.
205. The following New York decisions disallow tax upon a transfer attributable to
the donee where the appointed interest is less than the interest in default: Matter of
Slosson, 216 N. Y. 79, 110 N. E. 166 (1915) ; Matter of Canda, 197 App. Div. 597, 139
N. Y. Supp. 917 (lst Dep't 1921) ; Matter of Ripley, 122 App. Div. 419, 106 N. Y. Supp.
844 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 536, 84 N. E. 574 (1903) ; Matter of Lichtenstein,
177 Iisc. 320, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 455 (Surr. Ct. 1941) ; 'Matter of Vanderbilt, 163 Misc.
667, 297 N. Y. Supp. 554 (Surr. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. (2d) 379
(1939), aff'd sub norn. Whitney v. State Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530 (1940);
fatter of Irvin, 137 Misc. 666, 244 N. Y. Supp. 198 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of Tuck-
erman, 130 Misc. 806, 224 N. Y. Supp. 604 (Surr. Ct. 192); .Matter of Ryncar, 130
Misc. 804, 224 N. Y. Supp. 606 (Surr. Ct. 1927). But cf. Matter of Lowndes, 60 Misc.
506, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (Surr. Ct. 1908) ; see note 200 supra. In all the cases over-
ruling the claim for tax, except the Tuckerman case, the theory of election apparently
intrudes. However, the Rynear and Tuckerman cases were decided by the -ame judge.
In the Ripley case the appellate division relied on the alternative theory that the power
was exercisable only in favor of those who did not take as remaindermen in default, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed on this ground. In the Slosson. Ripley. TUanderbilt, Tuck!.-
erman, and Rynear cases the differences were quantitative. In the Canda Case the dif-
ference was apparently qualitative, and in the Irvin case the nature of the difference is
not clear. The Lichtenstein decision involved a postponement of the receipt of tle prin-
cipal and relied upon the federal decisions. The court stated, 177 Misc. at 326, 30 N. Y.
S. (2d) at 461: "If the appointment is to one who would take on failure to appint
but the estate granted is less than the gift under the donor's will the right to elect is n,,t
clear under the cases in this State!'
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title. Moreover, one may properly assume that the statute was intended
to produce uniform results on a nationwide basis."'
We have yet to consider the perhaps basic assumption of the divestment
theory, namely, that the Grinnell case applies in the absence of a renun-
ciation of the appointed interest and an election to take from the donor.
This principle seems to have become quite respectable. Although the Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Company case involved a renounced ap-
pointment, the court seemed to accept decisions in the Third and
Fourth Circuits applying the Grinnell case in the absence of a renuncia-
tion. 0  The Board, however, has vacillated on the subject 2 8 -and with
some justification in view of the Supreme Court's opinion in the recently
decided Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore case. This case
did not involve the problem here considered, 2 0 but in the course of its
opinion the Court made the following significant statement concerning
the Grinnell case:
"Whatever may be the general rule in this respect, this Court
has clearly recognized, in Helvering v. Griznell, . . . that events
subsequent to the decedent's death, events controlled by his bene-
ficiaries, can determine the inclusion or not of certain assets within
the decedent's gross estate under section 302(f) [Section 811 (f) of
the Code]. In that case, the decedent had exercised a general testa-
mentary power of appointment, an act which under section 302(f)
brings the property subject to the power within the gross estate. The
subsequent renouncement by the appointees of the right to receive
by appointment and their election to take as remaindermen in de-
fault of appointment were held by this Court to place the property
subject to the power outside the scope of section 302(f)." 210
This quotation is a fairly clear indication that the present Court regards
the principle of the Grinnell case as dependent upon a renunciation by the
appointees.2 ' As a matter of fact, this language announces the general
proposition that it is the exercise of the power which renders the appoint-
ive property taxable. If the renunciation is the decisive factor, the divest-
ment theory disintegrates and the mere appointment of a lesser interest
206. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 455.
207. See Legg's Estate v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; Roth-
ensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
208. Compare Estate of Mary Adele Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408 (1938), with Jamies
C. Webster, 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938). See (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 531.
209. For other aspects of the case see discussion at p. 306 supra.
210. 316 U. S. at 65.
211. See Monks v. Driscoll, C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 10,007 (W. D. Pa.
1943). While the quoted language appears in that portion of the opinion which failed to
command unanimous consent, there is no dissent from the language itself insofar as it
states the rationale of the Grinnell case. See 316 U. S. at 68. Cf. Davison v. Commis-
sioner, 81 F. (2d) 16, 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
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to takers in default would not result in tax immunity to the extent of the
lesser interest appointed.2"' On the other hand, the Central Hanover deci-
sion, with its attendant complexities, would not necessarily be discarded."'0
But even a renunciation should not remorselessly signify tax immunity to
the extent of the renounced interest. For example, the renounced interests
may still pass as part of the residuary bequest in the donee's will, or the
appointive property may have been so appropriated by the donee as to
pass as part of his estate,21 4 even though the particular appointment
fails.218 If the taker in default receives merely a life estate under the ap-
pointment, his renunciation of the appointed interest may cause the accel-
eration of the remainder, thus leaving no vestige of the ift in default.
21 3
Moreover, the renunciation should not be merely formal in character.
Where the appointee of a life estate, who would have received a fee inter-
est in default of appointment, continues to enjoy the income from the
property pursuant to the donee's trust arrangement, there is no renuncia-
tion in substance and the life estate should be taxed. The courts should
reasonably proceed one step further. When the contingencies upon which
enjoyment depends are determined by the donee's disposition, as in the
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company case, the property may fairly
be regarded as "passing" under the exercised power, since the renuncia-
tion has failed to restore the donor's pattern of devolution in the absence
of appointment." 7
The appointed interest is greater than the interest in default. Another
variation from the Grinnell pattern is provided by the appointment of
an interest of greater value than that bestowed by the gift in default. The
estate tax consequences of such an appointment have never been adjudi-
cated under the Grinnel case.2 1~8 A further extension of the logic applied
212. This implication from the Safe Deposit case is not fatally affected by the Court's
citation of Rothensies v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 112 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940). 316 U. S. at 62. This citation is joined with that of Hchvring -. Grinel! in sup-
port of the assertion that courts would not be interested in whether property passed under
a power if unexercised powers were taxable. See discussion infra at 338. But cf. Lewis v.
Rothensies, 46 F. Supp. 706 (E. D. Pa. 1942), which fails to discern the implication.
213. See discussion at p. 329 mtpra.
214. See 3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 365(3) ; Notes (1934) 93 A. L. R. 967.
215. Compare Attorney General v. Brackenbury, 1 H. & C. 782, 795 (1853) ; 1 PAUL
op. cit. supra note 4, at 461.
216. See 2 RESTATEmE, PrOPERTy (1936) §231; 3 SixtEs, op. cit. supra note 27,
§755 et seq. The renounced trust income may pass to those entitled to the next eventual
estate. See, e.g., Matter of Matthiessen, 175 Misc. 466, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 902 (Surr. Ct.
1940).
217. But cf. Estate of Henry H. Rogers, C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. E] 12230-A
(BTA mem.).
218. This type of case may tie in with the variation considered above. For e-ample,
the remainder in default may be given in equal shares to .4 and B. However, the donee
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where the interest in default is "cut down" might warrant the conclusion
that there is a taxable interest measured by the difference in value between
the appointed interest and the lesser interest in default.2 '0  This is the
position taken by the Restatement where the differences are solely quanti-
tative. 2 ° Thus, if A, B, and C7, the children of the donee of a general
power, are entitled to equal shares of the property in the absence of ap-
pointment, and the donee appoints the entire property to A, only twvo-
thirds of the estate would be taxable as "passing" tinder the power. But
the New York courts have held that where the interest received as ap-
pointee is greater than the interest in default, the value of the entire
property is taxable.2 1 The Lansing case yields to the Cooksey case. 22
An effort to confine the estate tax to the excess is resisted as an attempt
to secure something under a power in conjunction with an attempt to
avoid tax by renouncing the appointment to the extent that the appointee
could receive a portion of the property from the donor. 223 However, this
rationale is hardly convincing if the divestment theory, applied where
the appointed interest is less than that in default, continues to enjoy judicial
favor. For example, assume that A and B share equally in the property
in default of appointment, and that the donee appoints one-third to A and
two-thirds to B. It is extremely incongruous to hold that in the case of B
the donee's disposition is the source of his interest whereas in the case of
A the property is attributable to the donor. But the incongruity derives
essentially from the divestment theory, which should be repudiated. "-'
may appoint one-third of the property to A and the residue to B. Cf. Matter of Vander-
bilt, 163 Misc. 667, 297 N. Y. Supp. 554 (Surr. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E.
(2d) 379 (1939), aff'd .ub nora. Whitney v. State Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530
(1940).
219. See Powell, sufpra note 10, at 248; Thompson, supra note 8, 26 IoWA L. R:v.
549, 562.
220. 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 369(c). There is consequently no need to
consider the problem of comparative valuations discussed in connection with lesser ap-
pointed interests, and also applicable where the variation derives from greater appointed
interests.
221. See Matter of Delano, 176 N. Y. 486, 68 N. E. 871 (1903) ; Matter of Taylor, 209
App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 582, 147 N. E.
204 (1924) ; Matter of Potter, 51 App. Div. 212, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (2d Dep't 1900);
Matter of Chauncey, 102 Misc. 378, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (Surr. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 187
App. Div. 952, 175 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1919). Cf. Matter of King, 217 N. Y.
358, 111 N. E. 1060 (1916), to the effect that appointees cannot defeat the tax where
their title is not equally good under the donor's will. In Matter of Morrison, 122 Misc.
162, 203 N. Y. Supp. 367 (Surr. Ct. 1923), the Lansing rule was applied where the
appointee was the taker in default although the trust corpus included at the donee's death
49 additional shares of stock which were treated as an increment.
222. See Matter of Duryea, 277 N. Y. 310, 318, 14 N. E. (2d) 369, 371 (1938).
223. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 270, 273
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
224. Compare Matter of Vanderbilt, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. (2d) 379 (1939), aff'd
sub nora. Whitney v. State Tax Commission, 309 U. S. 530 (1940) ; Matter of Taylor,
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The appointmcnt excludes takers in dcfaudt. An additio nal problem is
presented where a donee appoints to one remainderman an interest equal in
value to that of his interest in default of appointment, and appoints the
balance to a non-taker in default. For example, assume that A and B
are the takers in default of equal portions of the property, and that the
donee appoints one half of the property to A and the other half to C.
If there is no renunciation and it is assumed that the Grimell case never-
theless applies, it would seem to follow that the portion appointed to 1
is immune from tax and that the portion appointed t-) C is taxable. But
this result disregards the effect of the appointment, for if .1 refused to
take his appointed share, it would pass in equal portions to 1 and B as
renaindermen in default, 22' and hence only one-fturth ,of the property
would pass to A under the donor's will in comparison with cone-half under
the appointment.
In New York the Court of Appeals has held that since the Lansing case
is not dependent upon a renunciation, the share appointed tto the taker in
default is entirely exempt under a set of facts similar to th,,se dis-
cussed.2206 According to the court, "the true rule to be applied can be
reached only by an entire disregard of any intention to elect or of what
has been termed an election, and may be stated to be that where a pers, in
named under the exercise of the power takes the same or less than he
would have taken under the original will, if the po'wer of appointment
had not been exercised, his interest is taxable in the estate of the donor
and not in the estate of the donee." '7 The Board of Tax Appeals lias
reached a similar result under the federal statute, deeming itself bi-mnd
209 App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y. 582, 147 N. E.
204 (1924).
225. Compare Matter of Taylor,.121 Misc. 7, 9, 200 N. Y. Supp. 321, 323 (Surr. Ct.
1923), aff'd, 209 App. Div. 299, 204 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N. Y.
582, 147 N. E. 204 (1924).
226. Matter of Duryea, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. -. (2d) 369 (1938). See 'Matter of
Chauncey, 102 Misc. 378, 168 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (Surr. Ct. 1918, aftf'd, 187 App. Div.
952, 175 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1919). But cf. Matter of Sandf,,rd, 250 App. Div.
310, 312, 293 N. Y. Supp. 991, 994 (1st Dep't 1937), modified, 277 N. Y. 323, 14 N. E.
(2d) 374 (1938). See Thompson, sulpra note 8, 26 IOWA L. REv,. at 557.
227. 277 N. Y. at 318, 14 N. E. (2d) at 372. The court seems to presume that the
donee intended to give to the appointed remainderman the very share that the latter would
have received in default of appointment. The concept of "electin" docs nct die easily.
See Matter of Lichtenstein, 177 Misc. 320, 326, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 455, 461 (Surr. Ct.
1941). Cf. opinion in Matter of Chauncey, 102 Misc. 378, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (Surr.
Ct. 1918), aff'd, 187 App. Div. 952, 175 N. Y. Supp. 897 (1st Dep't 1919), distinguishing
between a "renunciation" in the sense of an actual rejection of prt.perty offered by another,
and an "election" or "disclaimer" whereby the taker simply requires the court to examine
the effect of the appointment on his interest in default of appointment In short, the elec-
tion becomes a mere fiction.
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by New York "property" law."" The reasoning in the Lansing case in
connection with the appointee's election thus becomes mere excess ver-
biage. " As indicated above,23 however, the Supreme Court now seems
to consider the Grinnell doctrine as inherently dependent upon a renun-
ciation of the appointed interest, and thus the appointee's entire share
should be taxable if he fails to renounce his rights tinder the appoint-
ment.231
THE FAILURE OF THE CLIFFORD CONCEPT
The ineffectiveness of the provision expressly dealing with powers of
appointment finally caused the Government to turn to another provision
of the basic section defining the gross estate. 22 2 It selected subsection (a),
which requires the inclusion in the gross estate of all property "to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
In the Field case the Supreme Court had held that under the early ver-
sion of this provision property appointed under a general power was not
includible in the donee's estate.233 But the winds of doctrine had shifted
since the Field case, for the Supreme Court no longer interpreted the
estate tax statute as if it were medieval property law. 34 Moreover, in
Helvering v. Clifford 23 5 it had held that under section 22 (a), the general
provision defining taxable income, a grantor of a trust was taxable on
its income yield although he no longer owned the property in the technical
property sense and despite the fact that other provisions of the income
tax statute contained specific provisions taxing the income of certain trust
arrangements to the grantor.3 6 The Court had thus evolved a concept
of substantial ownership for income tax purposes which might be car-
ried over to the estate tax statute. Also, on various occasions the Court
228. James C. Webster, 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938), (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 531. But
see discussion at p. 332 supra.
229. But cf. Estate of Elston, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 652, 657, 90 P. (2d) 608, 611 (1939).
230. See discussion at p. 334 supra.
231. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 461; Griswold, supra note 8, at 936;
(1941) 41 CoL. L. REV. 149, 152.
232. Revenue Act of 1926, § 302; INT. REv. CODE § 811 (1939).
233. See discussion at p. 300 supra.
234. Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940), with Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935), and Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co,,
296 U. S. 48 (1935). For a discussion of the changing tax climate see 1 PAUL, op. Cit.
supra note 4, § 1.12.
235. 309 U. S. 331 (1940). See also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Har-
rison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941) ; Helvering v. Stuart, 63 Sup. Ct. 140 (1942).
236. For commentaries on this decision see PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION,
TianW SFuEs (1940) 200; Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The
Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 213; Ray, The Income Tax on
Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 HARV. L. REV. 1322, 1348; Note (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 1305.
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had indicated that the provisions defining the gross estate were not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive in subject matter."T
The Government relied, though without success, upon a similar con-
cept of substantial ownership in the Safe Deposit case, involving the
estate of a decedent who was the beneficiary of three trusts. Under one
of the trusts he was entitled to a portion of the income until lie became
28. at which time he was to receive the entire trust property as ahsolute
owner; under the others he enjoyed a life estate subject to specified
restrictions before he became 28. In addition, he had a general testamen-
tary power of appointment over the property in all the trusts, with re-
remainder, in default of appointment, in favor of his descendants. or, if he
had none, to his brother and sisters. The decedent died at the age of 20
and a purported exercise of his power was accordingly held invalid. It
was argued that although the power was not exercised the property was
nevertheless taxable under subsection (a) because the rights possessed
by the decedent were attributes of ownership substantially equivalent
to a fee simple title, subject only to specified restrictions on alienation
and the use of income."8 In rejecting this argument, the Court mar-
shalled legislative history, administrative construction, and judicial prece-
dents, particularly the Field case, in support of the result. The Field case
was clearly a formidable obstacle, unless its basic thought that subsection
(a) refers to property owned by the decedent was to be abanduned."=
This the Court refused to do on the ground that the language of the stat-
ute and the guides to its proper interpretation barred the application of
the Clifford principle "that the realities of the taxpayer's economic inter-
est rather than the niceties of the conveyancer's art" are indicators of
statutory meaning.2 40
It is obvious that there are limits to statutory interpretati, n and that
a point is finally reached where the desirable and the enacted can no longer
be honestly identified as one. 41 Yet it is difficult to say that the legisla-
tive materials were more indicative of meaning here than the legislative
data in the Clifford case, in which Mr. Justice Douglas, cc .ncentrating upon
the allegedly broad language of section 22(a), refused to allow such data
to undermine the broad concept of ownership discovered in the interstices
of the statute. -42 The difference in judicial reactiun to the Clifford and
237. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.12.
238. Compare Stratton v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 48, 49 t C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
239. The opinion also quoted Burnet v. Guggenheim, 2SS U. S. 280, 283 (1033). There
was no mention of Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 442 (1933), %,which seems to
have some relevance.
240. 316 U. S. at 58. But cf. McDougal, supra nute 1, at 1115, n. 59.
241. Compare Commissioner v. Beck, 129 F. (2d) 243,245 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); 1 Pv!,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 44. See also the stimulating discussicn in Fro iz IP . Wi ia
AN-GELs (1942) 346.
242. See 309 U. S. at 337.
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Safe Deposit cases was probably little affected by meticulous regard for
legislative intention or the lack of it. The vital distinction was one of
tax context. In the Clifford case the Court had to deal with an obvious
attempt by a full-fledged owner of property to shift the incidence of
tax by making certain innocuous legal gestures. The Safe Deposit case,
on the other hand, involved an "innocent" decedent who had never attained
the full dignity of ownership and, nevertheless, without specific Congres-
sional authorization, was being saddled with its tax consequences.la
The Government's defeat in the Safe Deposit case constituted addi-
tional evidence of the need for statutory change.' 44 Even victory would
not have enabled the Government to deal in thoroughgoing fashion with
powers of appointment, and there would be an unfortunate lenumbra of
uncertainty. For example, if a power were not general, the question would
remain whether the donee had sufficient contacts with the appointive
property to warrant its inclusion in his gross estate. Then again, a donee
might not have enjoyed a life estate prior to death, and the problem would
arise whether such an interest was a necessary ingredient of "substantial
ownership." A clean-cut legislative operation was the only appropriate
remedy for ridding the estate tax of property anachronisms which have
been "productive of litigation 24 but not of revenue." 2'"
(This article will be concluded in a subsequent issue)
243. Compare Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 178 (1933). But cf. the implications
of Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S.
684 (1941).
244. The following conform to the Safe Deposit decision: Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Co. v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 731 (E. D. Pa. 1942) ; Robsky v. Hickey, C. C. H. 1942
Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 1 10,187; Estate of Sarah P. White, C. C. H. 1942 Fed. Tax Serv.
1 12,522-G (BTA mem.); Estate of Henry H. Rogers, C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
f 12,230-A (BTA mem.). Cf. Evelyn Clark, 47 B. T. A. 865 (1942). The influence of
the Safe Deposit case has already spread to other areas of estate tax incidence. See
Estate of Edward E. Bradley, 1 T. C. No. 69 (1943).
245. One might also add law review articles.
246. Compare statement of Mr. Paul in 1-earings before Cointttce on Ways ald
Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 91.
The need for legislative amendment does not imply that the courts are helpless to
-correct improper interpretations of the old statute. A legislative change does not call for
judicial paralysis as to the past. Cf. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 479 (1940). Courts
may still correct bad law superimposed judicially upon a statute, especially where the
Supreme Court has failed to speak upon an issue. Statutory changes, for example, do not
represent approval of all the refinements feeding on the Grinnell case. On the other hand,
legislative action provides the only method of immediately removing evils as to the
future. It is obviously not practical to wait many years until the courts straighten out
difficulties, assuming they finally do so.
Various collateral problems, such as appointments to charity and the gift tax, will be
discussed in connection with the new statute.
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